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Major railroad accidents have become almost commonplace
in recent years, often resulting in tragic injury and loss of life
to railroad workers as well as extensive property damage to the
railroads.1 The Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)2 al-
* © 1984 by William P. Murphy and © 1985 by THE MINNESOTA LAw
REvIEW FOUNDATION. All rights reserved.
** Associate, Beasley, Hewson, Casey, Colleran, Erbstein & Thistle, Phil-
adelphia, Pennsylvania.
1. See, e.g., Pattern Sought in Recent Series of Rail Crashes, N.Y. Times,
July 24, 1984, § 2, at 4, col. 6 (a head-on collision raised Amtrak's passenger
fatality total to 24 since its inception in 1971, eight of which occurred during
the seven-month period ending in July 1984); Officials Cite Safety Concerns
After Two Fatal Amtrak Accidents, N.Y. Times, July 16, 1984, § 1, at 21, col. 1
(citing unguarded crossings and weather-related track problems as main
trouble areas); 3 Killed as Train Falls into Ravine in Vermont HilL% N.Y.
Times, July 8, 1984, § 1, at 1, col. 6 (bad weather washed out track); Bodies of
Train Crew Found, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1984, § 1, at 20, col. 1 (locomotive
plunged from open railroad bridge); 4 Reported Dead as Train Jumps Tracks
in Texas, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1983, § 1, at 27, col. 1 (director of Texas Railroad
Commission described some track in area as being deteriorated); Derailment
in Canyon Starts Big Fire, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1983, § 1, at 16, col. 3 (describ-
ing derailment incident killing one crewman); Switch Misdirects Train, id. at
col. 4 (unexplained switch of train from main track responsible for accident); 2
Rail Deaths Tied to Traffic Change, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1983, § 2, at 5, col. 3
(track workers apparently unaware of traffic coming from both directions);
Trains Kill 2 Amtrak Workers N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1983, § 1, at 46, col. 5
(describing two separate accidents involving railroad employees); Train with
Toxic Liquids Derails and Explodes, N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1983, § 1, at 8, col. 6
(freight train derailment); Troubled Amtrak Train in a New Accident, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 27, 1983, § 1, at 5, col 5 (a single train, within a three-day period.
struck a car and killed the driver, struck and killed a woman fishing from a
train trestle, hit an abandoned pickup, and later struck a disabled tractor
trailor, all without the crew being cited for any safety violations); 11 Hurt in
Train Derailment N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1983, § 1, at 20, col. 6 (train struck
empty freight car, injuring seven railroad employees, three passengers, and a
firefighter).
Labor Department statistics indicate that workers in the category of
"transportation and public utilities," which includes railroads, suffer 24% of
the occupational fatalities although comprising only 7% of the workforce sam-
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lows interstate railroad workers and their dependent families
to recover from the railroad for injuries and death caused, at
least in part, by the negligence of the railroad or fellow em-
ployees.3 Recovery is proportionately reduced, but not barred,
by the injured or deceased worker's contributory negligence.4
The FELA thus provides compensatory relief for the worker's
injury or death and encourages railroads to improve industry
safety through the economic incentive of liability.5
The FELA's continued effectiveness is seriously
threatened, however, by the developing railroad strategy of fil-
ing "common law" claims for property damage caused by em-
ployee negligence. Accidents causing injury and death to
employees also may involve extensive damage to tracks and
pled. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 2196,
OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND ILLNESSES IN THE UNITED STATES BY INDUSTRY,
1982, at 35 (1984).
Whether the large number of accidents is caused by aging railroad infra-
structure-including rail lines and automatic signal equipment--or by em-
ployee negligence is a hotly disputed issue. In the American railroad system,
passenger service and freight service travel on the same tracks. Freight ser-
vice, being slower and heavier, can slow passenger traffic and create more
track problems. See ADVANCED RAIL TECHNOLOGY, REPORT OF HOUSE SUB-
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION, AVIATION AND MATERIALS, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 7 (1982); see also id, at v (stating that "the U.S. rail system continues to
deteriorate at an escalating rate").
The safety record of the Shinkansen, the Japanese high-speed rail, demon-
strates that there is room for improvement in this country. The traffic on the
Shinkansen runs during the day; at night the track is shut down, inspected,
and repaired. Id. at 3. Quoting the testimony of Dr. Koji Takahashi, the Se-
nior Vice President for Engineering of the Japanese National Railways, the
Subcommittee's report states: "In 17 years of actual service, the Shinkansen
has carried 1.7 billion passengers without a single accident or passenger in-
jury." Id. at 12.
2. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982).
3. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1982). FELA liability is triggered in favor of the plain-
tiff by evidence showing even the slightest railroad or co-worker negligence
and the most general causal relationship between that negligence and the
worker's injury or death. As the Supreme Court has observed, "Under this
statute the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofs justify with reason
the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in
producing the injury or death for which damages are sought." Rogers v. Mis-
souri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957) (per curiam) (footnote omitted); see
also Gallick v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 372 U.S. 108, 116 (1963) (jury must deter-
mine only whether the employer negligence played any role in producing the
harm). Many believe that this test is more easily satisfied than the one applied
in an ordinary negligence suit. See W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 80, at 578-79 (5th ed. 1984); C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS § 95, at 643 (4th ed. 1983) (citing authorities).
4. 45 U.S.C. § 52 (1982).
5. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
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equipment. In several recent FELA suits, railroads have
pressed counterclaims alleging that their property damage re-
sulted from the negligence of the worker who was injured or
killed.6 In at least one FELA action, the railroad also asserted
a property damage claim against the deceased employee's co-
workers7
These claims place the FELA in imminent and serious
jeopardy precisely at a time when the safety of our nation's
railroads is increasingly called into question.8 The FELA's ex-
clusive remedies9 are cold comfort to workers faced with rail-
6. See Cavanaugh v. Western Maryland Ry., 729 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 222 (1984). The Cavanaugh majority, id. at 294, cited
several cases in support of its holding that a railroad can, under certain cir-
cumstances, maintain a counterclaim against an FELA plaintiff. Eg., Consoli-
dated Rail Corp. v. Dobin, No. 81-2539 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 1981) (court
consolidating for trial FELA action and railroad's separate property damage
diversity suit after it previously had dismissed railroad's property damage
counterclaim); Key v. Kentucky & Ind. Terminal PR., Civ. C-78-0313-L(A)
(W.D. Ky. 1979); Kentucky & Ind. Terminal R. v. Martin, 437 S.W.2d 944
(Ky. 1969) (counterclaim deemed barred by employer's contributory negli-
gence); Capitola v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. RH., 258 Minn. 206, 103
N.W.2d 867 (1960) (counterclaim deemed barred by attributing co-workers'
negligence to employer). In pursuing the counterclaim strategy, the railroads
seek to take advantage of the age-old master-servant relation at common law,
a strategy that apparently went either unnoticed or unpursued by railroads for
many decades. See infra text accompanying notes 74-96.
7. Stack v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. IR., 94 Wash. 2d 155, 615 P. 2d 457
(1980) (en banc).
8. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
9. The FELA preempts all state workers' compensation statutes. See
New York Cent. R.PL v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147 (1917); infra notes 118-23 and
accompanying text. A disadvantage of this preemption is that the FELA re-
quires the -plaintiff to show that some employer or co-worker negligence re-
sulted in the worker's injury or death. See 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1982); S. REP. No.
460, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1908) (pointing out that the FELA was not
designed to create liability without negligence "although many wise and good
men think that that ought to be done"). Most workers' compensation systems
do not demand any showing of fault See 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION § 1.10 (1984). But cf. W. KEETON, supra note 3, § 80, at
573 (some worker's compensation cases still apply assumption of risk doctrine
to bar recovery). Customarily, therefore, a broader base of workers injured on
the job is entitled to some award under workers' compensation statutes than
under the FELA. Attorneys' fees also are recoverable under some state work-
ers' compensation laws. See 3 LARSON, supra, § 83.
A disadvantage of the workers' compensation systems is that they limit
compensation by a standard formula for measuring the level of disability and
the economic loss that flows from it. That formula, applied by an administra-
tive, rather than judicial, body, typically does not take into account elements
such as pain and suffering even when the injury is particularly severe and re-
sults from gross employer negligence. In many cases, compensation awards
are less than jury awards would be in a comparable situation. See W. KEETON,
1985] FELA
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road claims for property damage. Judgments for railroads on
supra note 3, § 80, at 574; Page, The Exclusivity of the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Remedy, 4 B.C. INDUS. & COMM. L. REV. 555 (1963). See generally 2 A.
LARSON, supra, ch. X (discussing disability and personal injury benefits).
Workers' compensation programs also often require a trial-like demonstration
that injuries are work-related. See 3 A. LARSON, supra, § 77A.44. Although,
theoretically, many workers' compensation cases could be concluded more
speedily than would be expected in the judicial process, the system still suffers
at times from payment delays and frivolous employer appeals. See Workers'
Comp: A Pocket Full of Woes, News Report, Channel 7, New York, New York,
June 28, 1984. See generally 3 A. LARSON, supra, § 80 (review of workers' com-
pensation awards).
In 1917, the Supreme Court upheld a series of state workers' compensa-
tion laws. In New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917), the Court
rejected a fourteenth amendment due process attack on a program mandating
employer compliance with a no-fault scheme of compensation requiring the
employer either to pay for insurance or to make a security deposit to ensure
prompt payment of awards to injured workers. Id. at 206-09. In Hawkins v.
Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210 (1917), the Court upheld an Iowa statute allowing work-
ers and employers to choose whether to be covered. Id. at 218. Under the
Iowa statute, an employer who unilaterally rejected the compensation system
would lose the "common law defenses," i.e. assumption of risk, contributory
negligence, and fellow servant rule, in tort actions brought by the worker. Id.
at 213. Finally, in Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917),
the Court approved a compulsory social insurance system that drew from a
state fund financed by industries classified into groups and assessed according
to the perceived level of hazard within each group. Id. at 243-44. Of course,
the program deprived employees of any common law action. Id. at 228; see also
Boston & Me. R.R. v. Armburg, 285 U.S. 234, 238 (1932) (upholding state's
power to alter common law).
In the heyday of workers' compensation programs, one author rejected
the idea of a federal workers' compensation act covering railroad workers in
favor of repealing the FELA so as to allow state workers' compensation acts to
apply instead. Note, Workmen's Compensation on Interstate Railways, 47
HARV. L. REV. 389 (1934) (prepared as a thesis in Professor Felix Frankfurter's
class). Another author suggested abandoning the FELA in favor of "auto-
matic" social insurance. Pollack, The Crisis in Work Injury Compensation On
and Off the Railroads, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 296 (1953). Neither ap-
proach was ever adopted.
Notably, in 1912, a federal Employers' Liability and Workmen's Compen-
sation Commission headed by Senator Sutherland recommended a workmen's
compensation bill. See MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
TRANSMITTING THE REPORT OF THE EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY AND WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION COMMISSION, S. Doc. No. 338, 62nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1912). The
bill, which would have created an exclusive and compulsory means of compen-
sation, was supported by President Taft and easily passed both the House and
the Senate. It never emerged from the conference committee, however. See
49 CONG. REC. 4677 (1913) (statement of Sen. Sutherland) (withdrawing bill
because of inability to work out differences between House and Senate ver-
sions). One author attributes the death of the federal workmen's compensa-
tion bill to its lukewarm reception from railroad unions. Miller, The Quest for
a Federal Workmen's Compensation for Railroad Employees, 18 LAW & CON.
TEMP. PROBS. 188, 191-92 (1953). Workers might have regarded the right to a
jury trial and the opportunity to recover for pain and suffering as essential in
[Vol. 69:349
property damage counterclaims in FELA actions negatively af-
fect the FELA's remedial design by reducing, extinguishing, or
surpassing the plaintiffs recovery.' 0 Moreover, railroad work-
ers or their families may be deterred from filing FELA suits in
circumstances involving both personal injury and property loss;
the potential FELA plaintiff would always risk the danger that
the railroad, with its manifestly superior investigative resources
and its position of authority over the injured worker and coem-
ployees, might respond aggressively with a major property
damage claim. Coemployees could also be inhibited from vol-
unteering evidence of their own negligence or of the railroad's
negligence for fear that they too would be swept up as defend-
ants in a suit for the railroad's property damage.11
Two major appellate decisions disagree sharply with re-
spect to the railroads' ability to assert property damage claims
against negligent employees in FELA actions. In Stack v. Chi-
cago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Co.,12 an FELA
suit was commenced on behalf of a worker killed in a railroad
collision. The railroad counterclaimed against decedent's estate
for negligently caused property damage and impleaded surviv-
ing co-workers. The Washington Supreme Court found that
the FELA's provisions interpreted in light of the Act's remedial
purpose barred the railroad's claims.13 In 1984, however, a di-
vided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
securing optimum recoveries. Perhaps the fear that attorneys' fees from possi-
ble administrative litigation would reduce the predictably lower compensation
awards offset the perceived benefits of the proposed bill. No strong opposition
to the bill appears to have been raised by railroad companies.
Had the federal workmen's compensation bill become law, a question
would have arisen as to whether a purely administrative federal remedy would
impinge on article III judicial powers and on the right to a jury trial, particu-
larly in the handling of the threshold question of coverage. One author
surmised that if, to solve such difficulties, a judicial forum were made avail-
able, the benefits of the program would be cancelled by the resulting increased
burden and cost of trials. Note, supra, at 408.
A federal workers' compensation scheme giving workers the option to re-
fuse coverage was also considered in the years after the 1912 bill. Resistance
among some railroad labor unions persisted and union pressure ultimately was
directed toward securing more effective enforcement of the FELA itself. See
Miller, supra, at 204.
10. See e.g., Cook v. St. Louis-San Francisco RR., Civ. 75-0791-D (W.D.
Okla. Aug. 3, 1977) (FELA plaintiff recovered $46,000; found liable on counter-
claim for $1.2 million).
11. See Stack v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R., 94 Wash. 2d 155, 159-60, 615
P.2d 457, 460 (1980) (en banc); infra notes 157-78 and accompanying text.
12. 94 Wash. 2d 155, 615 P.2d 457 (1980) (en banc).
13. Id. at 159-62, 615 P.2d at 459-61.
1985] FELA
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Fourth Circuit upheld a railroad's property damage counter-
claim in Cavanaugh v. Western Maryland Railroad Co.,14 find-
ing that nothing in the FELA demands such a "sacrifice" of the
railroad's "rights."15 As recognized in the Cavanaugh dissent,16
the decision supports the result in Cook v. St. Louis-San Fran-
cisco Railroad Co.,17 in which the FELA plaintiff recovered
$46,000, only to be found liable for $1.2 million on the railroad's
property damage counterclaim.
This Article contends that the FELA prohibits railroads
from asserting claims against employees for negligently causing
property damage. Part I discusses the evolution of the FELA,
examining the history of judicial hostility to the Act and Con-
gress's responsive clarification and expansion of the Act's pro-
tection of railroad workers. Part II focuses on the railroads'
counterclaim procedure for raising property damage claims in
FELA suits and explains the absence of any specific provision
expressly barring this procedure in light of the pre-FELA com-
mon law. This section further asserts that such claims,
whether brought as separate actions against potential FELA
plaintiffs or as counterclaims, are preempted by the FELA's
comprehensive liability design.
The Article next examines specific FELA provisions that
by their terms impliedly bar the railroads' property damage
counterclaims. Part III contends that the "no contract-no de-
vice" prohibition against exemptions from liability and its sole
setoff exception for railroad contributions to insurance benefits
require the exclusion of property damage counterclaims from
FELA actions. Part IV explores the inhibitory effect that in-
dependent railroad claims against co-workers of FELA plain-
tiffs might have in discouraging such employees from testifying
against the railroad in light of the congressional intent to pro-
tect FELA plaintiffs' free access to information regarding the
negligence of railroads and co-workers. It concludes that such
actions would unjustly hinder the ability of FELA plaintiffs to
gather information necessary to maintain their suits. Finally,
Part V suggests that Congress, in keeping with its long history
of protecting the FELA from judicial resistance, should clarify
the issue by amending the Act to bar railroads' property dam-
age claims against their employees.
14. 729 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 222 (1984).
15. Id at 291.
16. 729 F.2d at 297 (Hall, J., dissenting).
17. Civ. 75-0791-D (W.D. Okla. Aug. 3, 1977).
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I. THE FELA IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
By the advent of the twentieth century, the railroad indus-
try was one of America's most prominent businesses.18 Its op-
eration was vital to the nation's economy.19 The industrys
rapid technological and geographical growth, however, pro-
duced new risks and hazards for its workers. The incidence of
employee injury and death escalated alarmingly. In 1906 one
member of Congress grimly related:
In three months of last year there were 931 railroad employees killed
at their posts of duty. In three months of last year there were 13,217
railway employees injured at their posts of duty, not mentioning those
who met such slight injuries as only required lay off of two or three
days.20
The railroad industry and its labor force were pitted against
each other on an expanding and potentially catastrophic
battlefield.21
A. THE 1906 ACT
Disturbed by the railroads' rising rate of employee injury
and death and the resulting labor unrest, Congress proceeded
to develop legislation in 1906 designed to provide compensatory
relief for victims of negligence and to encourage railroads to
improve industry safety.22 An entirely new system imposing li-
18. See I. CLARK, THEN CAME THE RAILROADS: THE CENTURY FROM
STEAm TO DIESEL IN THE SoUTHwEST 312-17 (1958).
19. See H. BARGER, THE TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRIES 1889-1949: A
STUDY OF OUTPUT, EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY 24-38 (1951) (use of rail-
roads increased sixfold between 1889 and 1920); I. CLARK, supra note 18. at
275-311 (railroads responsible for colonization and subsequent industrial
development).
20. 40 CONG. REC. 4606 (1906) (statement of Rep. Mann).
21. Major railroad strikes in 1886, 1892, and 1894 highlighted the "close re-
lation between railroad transportation and the public welfare" and the devas-
tating impact that a breakdown in labor relations could have on the nation.
See R. SMITH, LABOR RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 26 (5th ed.
1974). As a result of these strikes, the railroad industry became the focus of
an incipient federal labor policy. Railroad labor unrest, such as that exper-
ienced in the Pullman Strike of 1894, helped to produce the Erdman Act,
which banned "yellow dog" contracts forbidding union membership. Erdman
Act, ch. 370, § 10, 30 StaL 424, 428 (1898); see B. MELTZER, LABOR LAW: CASES,
MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 29 (2d ed. 1977); R. SMITH, supra, at 26. The
Supreme Court, however, declared the "yellow dog" prohibition unconstitu-
tional in Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), reflecting, at least in part,
the judicial reluctance to approve statutory changes in common law rights. Cf.
infra text accompanying notes 56-59 (describing courts' continued application
of common law defenses to frustrate remedial purpose of FELA).
22. In expressing the compensatory purpose of the 1908 FELA, the Senate
Commitee on Education and Labor reported that "there is nothing extreme or
1985] FELA
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ability on railroads was necessary to achieve these remedial and
regulatory ends. Common law was no longer adequate to gov-
ern the complicated area of industrial labor relations:
In the complex organization of society that now exists the oldtime
common law of master and servant has no longer fitting application to
this subject. There is a new heaven and a new earth with respect to
the organization of labor.
23
Consequently, despite some concern about its power to alter
common law tradition,24 Congress enacted the Federal Em-
ployer's Liability Act "to give relief against the rigors of the
common law" by placing liability for employee injuries and
deaths on the "important, extensive, and hazardous" railroad
industry.25
The 1906 FELA modified the common law contributory
negligence bar,26 abolished the fellow servant rule,27 and pro-
revolutionary in the opinion that the whole community should share . .. in
the loss which arises from an accident which befalls one [railroad employee]."
S. REP. No. 460, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1908). The Committee recognized that,
although common law placed much of the economic burden for industrial acci-
dents on the worker, the railroads now were stronger and better able to ab-
sorb the cost and, at times, did so voluntarily. See id. at 1-3.
In addition to this compensatory purpose of the Act, its closely related
regulatory aim has been noted by the Supreme Court: "The natural tendency
of the changes [from common law] is to impel the carriers to avoid or prevent
the negligent acts and omissions which are made the bases of the rights of re-
covery which the statute creates and defines .... " Mondou v. New York,
N.H. & H. R.R., 223 U.S. 1, 50-51 (1911); see also Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281
U.S. 635, 640 (1930) ("The Act ... is intended to stimulate carriers to greater
diligence for the safety of their employees and of the persons and property of
their patrons.").
23. 40 CONG. REC. 7661 (1906) (statement of Sen. Daniel).
24. See 40 CONG. REC. 4605 (1906) (statement of Rep. Crumpacker) ("Per-
sonal-injury cases, even against interstate-transportation companies, have al-
ways been regarded as local and subject only to State laws .... "). The
argument that the alterations of the common law contained in the 1906 enact-
ment violated states' rights and exceeded the power of Congress were dis-
missed by the Supreme Court in Howard v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 207 U.S. 463,
491-92 (1908); see infra text accompanying notes 37-40, which in turn increased
the chances of additional aggressive legislative intrusions.
25. 40 CONG. REc. 4608 (1906) (statement of Rep. Flood). Congress relied
on some path-breaking state statutes in its modification of common law doc-
trines. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 2335, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1906) (compiling
pre-FELA state statutory modifications of the fellow servant doctrine).
26. FELA, Pub. L. No. 59-219, § 2, 34 Stat. 232, 232 (1906) (reenacted in
amended form and codified at 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1982)).
27. Id § 1, 34 Stat. 232, 232 (1906) (reenacted in amended form and codi-
fied at 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1982)) (railroad liable for negligence of "its officers,
agents, or employees"). The fellow servant rule barred workers' recovery
against their employer for injuries caused by the negligence of fellow employ-
ees. See W. KEETON, supra note 3, § 80, at 577.
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vided an action for wrongful death.28 Because the Act was not
a workers' compensation act,29 however, the FELA plaintiff
was still required to prove that some negligence by railroad of-
ficers, agents, or fellow workers caused the employee's injuries
or death.30 Furthermore, contributory negligence as a complete
bar to recovery was relaxed only when the negligence of the
employee was slight and that of the railroad or coemployee was
gross by comparison, in which case the employee's negligence
would reduce the FELA recovery proportionately.31
Although Congress was cautiously selective in modifying
specific common law doctrines, it was determined to protect the
impact of such modifications. Congress feared that railroads,
with approval from courts accustomed to common law limita-
tions, would escape FELA liability under contractual arrange-
ments such as releases in employment contracts.3a To preclude
this possibility, Congress added a stern "no contract" provision
to the FELA:
[NMo contract of employment, insurance, relief, benefit, or indemnity
for injury or death entered into by or on behalf of any employee, nor
the acceptance of any such insurance, relief benefit or indemnity by
the person entitled thereto, shall constitute any bar or defense to any
action brought to recover damages for personal injuries to or death of
such employee.33
Because Congress believed that this provision would have pre-
28. FELA, Pub. L. No. 59-219, § 1, 34 Stat. 232, 232 (1906) (reenacted in
amended form and codified at 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1982)).
29. Workers' compensation schemes were considered and rejected without
criticism of their concept. S. REP. No. 460, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1908); see
also supra note 9 (discussing workers' compensation programs).
30. In its present form, the FELA provides that an FELA plaintiff may
recover for injury or death "resulting in whole or in part from the negligence
of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any
defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances,
machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment." 45
U.S.C. § 51 (1982). This is substantially the same provision as § 1 of the 1906
enactment. FELA, Pub. L. No. 59-219, § 1, 34 Stat. 232, 232 (1906) (reenacted
in amended form and codified at 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1982)).
31. FELA, Pub. L. No. 59-219, § 2, 34 Stat. 232, 232 (1906) (reenacted in
amended form and codified at 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1982)).
32. HL REP. No. 2335, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1906). One variation of such
railroad-initiated exoneration consisted of the employee's written discharge of
the railroad's liability in exchange for railroad-funded insurance protection
through so-called "relief departments." I&L at 6. Although these practices
were banned by some state court decisions and state statutes, Congress, in en-
acting the "no contract" provision, intended to create a uniform, national rule.
Id at 5.
33. FELA, Pub. L. No. 59-219, § 3, 34 Stat. 232, 232 (1906) (reenacted in
amended form and codified at 45 U.S.C. § 55 (1982)).
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vented railroads from setting off their contributions to certain
benefit programs, such as insurance compensating employees
for injury or death, Congress added a proviso allowing railroads
to deduct such contributions from FELA damages.34
Congress, relying on its still-fledgling commerce clause
power,35 employed a casually broad approach to extend the
scope of the 1906 FELA to include "every common carrier" en-
gaged in interstate commerce. 36 The Act thus applied to work-
ers injured in intrastate railroad activities if the carrier did
some general interstate business. This novel theory of congres-
sional commerce clause power was fatal to the 1906 FELA. In
1908, the Supreme Court, in Howard v. Illinois Central Rail-
road Co.,37 held that the statute unconstitutionally regulated
purely intrastate commerce. 38 The Court stated that Congress
could impose liability on a railroad only when the employee
was killed or injured while the railroad was engaged in inter-
state commerce. 39 In declaring the FELA invalid, however, the
Supreme Court minimized challenges to those portions of the
Act modifying common law doctrines: "[W]ithout even for the
sake of argument conceding the correctness of these sugges-
tions, we at once dismiss them from consideration as concern-
ing merely the expediency of the act and not the power of
Congress to enact it."40
B. THE 1908 ACT
In 1908, Congress reenacted the FELA, limiting the scope
of the railroads' liability to those injuries and deaths occurring
"while engaging" in interstate commerce. 41 Heeding President
34. Id.; see infra notes 148-54 and accompanying text.
35. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 138-57 (2d ed. 1983) (tracing early history of federal commerce clause
power).
36. FELA, Pub. L. No. 59-219, § 1, 34 Stat. 232, 232 (1906) (emphasis ad-
ded) (reenacted in amended form and codified at 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1982)).
37. 207 U.S. 463 (1908).
38. The Court stated:
The act then being addressed to all common carriers engaged in
interstate commerce, and imposing a liability upon them in favor of
any of their employees, without qualification or restriction as to the
business in which the carriers or their employees may be engaged at
the time of the injury, of necessity includes subjects wholly outside of
the power of Congress to regulate commerce. . ..
Id. at 498.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 492.
41. FELA, Pub. L. No. 60-100, § 1, 35 Stat. 65, 65 (1908) (codified at 45
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Theodore Roosevelt's advice,42 however, Congress took advan-
tage of Howard's implied approval of the common law altera-
tions in the 1906 FELA by greatly strengthening the Act's
compensatory provisions. The legislation was decisively proem-
ployee, and-it reflected Congress's growing suspicions that rail-
roads would seek to evade the FELA's remedial and regulatory
design by pursuing common law defenses.
Congress demonstrated its resolve to prevent such industry
evasions by rejecting the 1906 FELA's modified contributory
negligence bar43 in favor of a pure comparative negligence pro-
vision.44 Thus, under the 1908 enactment, the FELA plaintiff
always could recover damages in proportion to the negligence
of the railroad or co-workers, even if those parties were only
slightly negligent and the plaintiff was grossly negligent. Sig-
nificantly, the worker was deemed free of all negligence when
a railroad violation of a statute enacted for employee safety
contributed to the worker's injury or death.45 The restored Act
U.S.C. § 51 (1982)). This definition gave rise to the so-called "moment of in-
jury" test for determining whether a worker was within the regulation of in-
terstate commerce. See Shanks v. Delaware, Lack. & W. R.R., 239 U.S. 556,
558 (1916) (test is whether employee was "at the time of injury engaged in in-
terstate transportation or in work so closely related to it as to be practically a
part of it").
42. In a message to the Senate, President Roosevelt urged Congress to re-
enact a strengthened FELA:
By a substantial majority the Court holds that the Congress has
power to deal with the question in so far as interstate commerce is
concerned.
As regards the employers' liability law, I advocate its immediate
enactment, limiting its scope so that it shall apply only in the class of
cases as to which the Court says it can constitutionally apply, but
strengthening its provisions within this scope.
42 CONG. REc. 1347 (1908) (special message of President T. Roosevelt) (empha-
sis added).
43. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
44. FELA, Pub. L. No. 60-100, § 3, 35 Stat. 65, 66 (1908) (codified at 45
U.S.C. § 53 (1982)). The FELA's comparative negligence provision is "pure" in
the sense that it does not bar recovery even if the worker's negligence was
greater than that of the railroad. For examples of state statutes applying such
a preclusion, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (1973); IDAHO CODE § 6-801
(1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 (1977).
45. FELA, Pub. L. No. 60-100, § 3, 35 Stat. 65, 65 (1908) (codified at 45
U.S.C. § 53 (1982)). The pre-FELA safety legislation consists essentially of the
Safety Appliance Act, ch. 196, 27 Stat. 531 (1893) (codified as amended at 45
U.S.C. §§ 1-10 (1982)), which regulates such matters as automatic couplers,
handholds, and brakes. The other major safety statute is the Boiler Inspection




also abolished the assumption of risk defense in such cases,46 an
issue that the 1906 FELA had not addressed.
Another telling example of Congress's determination to
safeguard its liability program was its revision of the FELA's
"no contract" rule.47 Congress was aware that the expanded
rights of railroad workers might encounter strong judicial
resistance, just as it was aware of the courts' sometimes aggres-
sive use of injunctions to quell concerted action by labor un-
ions.48 The amended Act inserted broad admonitory language
prohibiting interference with the FELA's objectives: "[A]ny
contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose or
intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier to ex-
empt itself from any liability created by this Act, shall to that
extent be void."49 Congress added a single setoff exception to
this new "no contract-no device" command for insurance con-
tributions by employers.50
The Supreme Court had forced Congress to sacrifice appli-
cation of its remedial legislation to workers injured or killed on
intrastate jobs, but the 1908 Act otherwise was more protective
of the interests of railroad workers and more constitutionally
secure than was the 1906 version. Although the FELA re-
mained in this basic form for more than three decades, in 1910
Congress had to make an interim adjustment to counter the ef-
fect of an unexpected judicial interpretation.
46. FELA, Pub. L. No. 60-100, § 4, 35 Stat. 65, 66 (1908) (codified as
amended at 45 U.S.C. § 54 (1982)).
47. Id. § 5, 35 Stat. 65, 66 (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 55 (1982)). For the text
of the 1906 version, see supra text accompanying note 33.
48. The civil injunction device replaced criminal prosecutions once stat-
utes began to legalize the existence of unions. Witte, Early American Labor
Cases, 35 YALE L. J. 825 (1926). One of the first examples of the use of the
injunction against organized labor was the celebrated case of In re Debs, 158
U.S. 564 (1895). Professor Owen Fiss relates that because of the injunction is-
sued by the trial court in the Debs case, 64 F. 724 (C.C.N.D. 111. 1894), "federal
troops had been deployed, Eugene Debs was arrested and removed from the
field, the [Pullman] strike was broken, and the American Railway Union de-
stroyed." 0. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 2 (1978). Once ushered in, the
injunction flourished as a device by which legislative reforms and regulation of
business practices were judicially resisted. Id.
49. FELA, Pub. L. No. 60-100, § 5, 35 Stat. 65, 66 (1908) (codified at 45
U.S.C. § 55 (1982)).
50. I&; see H.R. REP. No. 1386, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1908); H.R. REP.
No. 2335, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1906); infra notes 148-54 and accompanying
text.
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C. THE 1910 A MENDmENTS
In Hoxie v. New York, New Haven and Harford Railroad
Co.,151 the Connecticut Supreme Court held that federal courts
had exclusive jurisdiction over suits brought under the 1908
FELA.52 Hoxie's inhospitable treatment of the FELA set the
stage for further strengthening by Congress of its remedial pro-
gram. The resulting amendment evidenced a strong federal
policy to endow the FELA plaintiff with even more protections
by honoring the plaintiff's choice of legal battlefield. It not
only assured FELA plaintiffs of concurrent jurisdiction,w but
also precluded railroad defendants from removing actions filed
in state court.54 The amendment also expanded possible venues
to allow plaintiffs to file suit in a district court for the district
where the defendant resided or did business or where the cause
of action arose.55
51. 82 Conn. 352, 73 A. 754 (1909).
52. Id at 363, 73 A. at 759.
53. FELA, Pub. L. No. 61-117, sec. 1, § 6, 36 Stat. 291, 291 (1910) (codified
at 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1982)). Although the FELA did not expressly address the
issue of concurrent state-federal versus exlusive federal jurisdiction, some
members of Congress believed that the FELA clearly allowed concurrent ju-
risdiction. See e-g., 45 CONG. REc. 2253 (1910) (statement of Rep. Sterling).
Senator Borah, arguing in support of an FELA provision unambiguously guar-
anteeing concurrent jurisdiction, stated:
I think it so well established and so thoroughly settled that both fed-
eral and state courts have jurisdiction, subject to the power of re-
moval of these causes of action, that it seems unnecessary to
incoporate it into the law.
But nevertheless a very respectable court, and one whose opin-
ions are entitled to a great deal of respect, has refused to take juris-
diction of this class of cases, holding that it was the evident intent of
Congress to confine this class of cases to the jurisdiction of the federal
court....
45 CONG. REc. 4035 (1910) (statement of Sen. Borah).
54. FELA, Pub. L. No. 61-117, sec. 1, § 6, 36 Stat. 291, 291 (1910) (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a) (1982)).
55. Id (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1982)). This venue provision also was a
congressional reaction to restrictive judicial interpretations of the FELA. See
45 CONG. REC. 2253 (1910) (statement of Rep. Sterling) ("As the law is now
suit can be brought only in the district where the defendant is. an inhabitant.
It has been so held by one of the federal courts in Texas.").
An additional 1910 amendment established that a deceased worker's rep-
resentative in an FELA action could recover for the pain and suffering the
worker endured between injury and death. FELA, Pub. L. No. 61-117, sec. 2,
§ 9, 36 Stat. 291, 291 (1910) (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 59 (1982)). Congressman
Sterling remarked in the House debates:
[This] amendment relates to the survival of the action. One of
the courts in Connecticut held that under this law, where the injured
party died before action was commenced .... the action did not sur-
vive to the personal representative of the deceased. This provides
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D. THE 1939 AMENDMENTS
Despite the clear intent of Congress to prevent common
law frustration of FELA enforcement, some courts continued to
apply common law defenses permitting railroads to escape lia-
bility. The courts' aversion to the FELA was most conspicuous
in the judicial resistance to the 1908 "no contract-no device"
provision.56 For example, after railroads began publishing rou-
tine reports of unsafe conditions in timetables and other docu-
ments, several courts found that employees thereby had
received "notice" of the hazards and assumed the risk of any
resulting injuries.5 7 The House Judiciary Committee in 1938
condemned these decisions, insisting that "such a scheme of
charging notice to an employee is a device to escape liability"
and thus is barred as an FELA defense.58 The Committee ob-
served further that "the aggressions of the courts have given to
the defense of assumption of risk a scope and quality that
threatens the enforcement of the act."59
Congress's 1939 amendments responded to this judicial hos-
that the action shall survive to the personal representative for the
benefit of the widow or next of kin in the order named in the original
law.
45 CONG. REc. 2253-54 (1910) (statement of Rep. Sterling). Although the
amendment was counter to the rule in Illinois and other states, id. at 2254
(statement of Rep. Sterling), the laws of some states, such as Arkansas, pro-
vided precedential support for the survival provision. See 45 CONG. REc. 4120
(1910) (statement of Sen. Borah).
56. See supra text accompanying notes 47-50.
57. In New York, Chic. & St. L. R.R. v. McDougall, 15 F.2d 283 (6th Cir.
1926), the railroad had given McDougall a general "timetable," which he
signed, enumerating low bridges and other hazards. Six months later, McDou-
gall's head struck an overhead bridge while he sat atop a boxcar waiting to re-
ceive a signal from the conductor. Even though that bridge had not been listed
specifically in the timetable, the court deemed that the assumption of risk de-
fense was applicable. Id. at 284-85; see also H.R. REP. No. 2153, 75th Cong., 3d
Sess. 2-3 (1938) (referring to the McDougall case). But see Brant v. Chicago &
Alton R.R., 294 Ill. 606, 620, 128 N.E. 732, 737 (1920) (holding that employee's
agreement to assume the risk of existing conditions in the yard violated § 5 of
the FELA).
58. H.R. REP. No. 2153, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 3 (1938) (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 2; see also H.R. REP. No. 1222, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1939) (re-
peating this language verbatim). Moreover, courts increasingly had treated
the availability of the assumption of risk defense as a matter of law, thus
preventing any check that might have resulted from submitting the issue to a
jury. In response, the 1939 House report stated:
At the beginning this defense was deemed to be at most a jury
question. But repeated holdings have encroached more and more
upon the right of the employee and various new doctrines or amplifi-
cations of previous principles have tended constantly to treat this de-
fense as one to be determined by the courts as a "matter of law"-
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tility to the FELA's remedial and regulatory purposes. 60 Un-
willing to risk further misinterpretations of the "no contract-no
device" provision, Congress explicitly barred the assumption of
risk defense in FELA actions.6 1 It also extended the Act's stat-
ute of limitations from two to three years62 and expanded the
definition of interstate commerce to profit from recent
Supreme Court decisions giving Congress greater regulatory
power.6 3 Under the latter change, all railroad workers whose
activities were in "furtherance of interstate or foreign com-
merce" or would, "in any way directly or closely and substan-
tially, affect such commerce" were protected by the FELA's
umbrella.64
Finally, an additional amendment barred "[a]ny contract,
rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose, intent, or
effect of which shall be to prevent employees of any common
carrier from furnishing voluntarily information to a person in
interest" regarding an accident.65 The amendment also im-
posed criminal sanctions for any "threat, intimidation, order,
rule, contract, regulation, or device whatsoever" that prevented
any person from furnishing such information.66 Adopting the
open-ended language of the "no contract-no device" provision,67
this new section protected against both the practices enumer-
ated in the legislative history and "any device whatsoever" that
would have the effect of preventing voluntary furnishing of in-
taking it away from the jury;, and the courts have decided now it is a
question of law.
Id.
60. Because some railroad labor unions were not convinced that workers'
compensation boards were a better alternative than jury trials, efforts were fo-
cused on improving FELA protections within the existing system. Bills were
introduced to amend the FELA in both 1938 and 1939. See, eg., S. 1708, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) (expanding class of workers deemed to be engaged in
interstate commerce); H.Ra 4988, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) (eliminating the
assumption of risk defense); H.R 10,296, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) (same).
61. FELA, Pub. L. No. 76-382, sec. 1, § 4, 53 Stat. 1404, 1404 (1939) (codi-
fied at 45 U.S.C. § 54 (1982)).
62. Id. sec. 2, § 6, 53 Stat. 1404, 1404 (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1982)).
63. Id sec 1, § 1, 53 Stat. 1404, 1404 (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1982)).
64. Id. This effectively did away with the "moment of injury" doctrine
and expanded FELA coverage to virtually all railroad workers. The question
of coverage under this amendment becomes simply whether anything the em-
ployee does affects interstate commerce. See; eg., Reed v. Pennsylvania RR.,
351 U.S. 502 (1956) (applying FELA to railroad filing clerk hurt by a broken
window).
65. FELA, Pub. L. No. 76-382, see. 2, § 10, 53 Stat. 1404, 1404-05 (1939)
(codified at 45 U.S.C. § 60 (1982)).
66. Id. sec. 2, § 10, 53 Stat. 1404, 1405 (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 60 (1982)).
67. See supra text accompanying note 49.
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formation. By enacting these changes, Congress demonstrated
even more strongly than it had before its dissatisfaction with
courts' use of common law theories to thwart the FELA's re-
medial purposes.
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CONGRESS'S
"INATTENTION" IN THE FELA TO THE
RAILROADS' PROPERTY DAMAGE
COUNTERCLAIM
The FELA's historical evolution reveals Congress's contin-
uous effort to provide relief for an employee killed or injured
through the negligence of the railroad or co-workers. No rail-
road defensive tactic has more potential for destroying the
worker's relief than the railroad's property damage counter-
claim. If the railroad should succeed on the counterclaim, the
FELA plaintiff's recovery could be largely, if not entirely, elim-
inated.68 No FELA provision, however, expressly bars railroads
from pursuing property damage counterclaims in FELA
actions.
In Cavanaugh V. Western Maryland Railway Co.,69 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit inferred
from this lack of any explicit prohibition of counterclaims that
Congress intended to allow them in FELA suits. 70 In expres-
sing its view that this omission was not inadvertent, the court
noted that Congress had expressly barred or modified other
railroad defenses prejudicial to FELA plaintiffs.71 Thus, the
court reasoned, Congress's inattention to the property damage
counterclaim implied its intention to preserve such defensive
claims.72
68. See Cook v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 75 F.R.D. 619 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (FELA
plaintiff recovered $46,000 but was found liable on counterclaim for $1.2 mil-
lion), cited in Cavanaugh v. Western Maryland Ry., 729 F.2d 289, 297 (Hall, J.,
dissenting), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 222 (1984).
69. 729 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1984).
70. See id. at 291 (plaintiff unable to point to any explicit language in
FELA prohibiting counterclaim).
71. 1d. (citing the Act's preclusion of the assumption of risk defense and
modification of the contributory negligence defense).
72. Id. ("[Congress] could as easily, had it intended such a result, have
barred the defending railroad from asserting by a counterclaim in such action
its own claim for damages against the suing plaintiff for damages caused
wholly by the negligence of that plaintiff, but it did not choose to do so."). The
Cavanaugh majority found evidence of Congress's intent to allow the rail-
road's counterclaim in Rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which requires a defendant to plead all transactionally related counterclaims.
FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a). The court questioned the logic of barring counterclaims
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Inflexible application of the expressio unius est exclusio al-
terius theory of statutory construction often does violence to
the true intent of Congress.7 3 The Cavanaugh court's reliance
under the FELA that would seem to be compulsory under Rule 13(a), 729 F.2d
at 294, and indicated its disbelief that Congress would compel such an 'unfair
result," Id. at 291.
Barring the counterclaim, however, would be "unfair" only if the FEIA,
in conjunction with the supremacy clause of the constitution, otherwise per-
mitted the railroad's claim. Since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "shall
not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right" 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982),
Rule 13(a) obviously does not create any right of action in the railroad for
property damage negligently caused by a railroad worker. Instead, the inquiry
must be whether a state law cause of action such as that asserted in Cava-
naugh exists at all and, if so, whether it nevertheless has been superseded by
virtue of the supremacy of the FELA over any state law that conflicts or inter-
feres with its terms or policies. As always, it is the intent of Congress that
controls. See, eg., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980); Philbrook
v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975); United States v. Braverman, 373 U.. 405,
408 (1963).
Several traditional and interrelated principles of statutory construction
are relevant in determining congressional intent under the FELA: that safety
legislation is to be construed liberally to effectuate the congressional purpose,
Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 13 (1980); "that remedial legislation
should be construed broadly to effectuate its purpose," Tcherepnin v. Knight,
389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); that state legislation that frustrates the full effective-
ness of federal law and policy is invalid under the supremacy clause, Perez v.
Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 650-52 (1971); and that a statute must be construed in
keeping with the spirit of the legislation, United Steelworkers of America v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979).
These general principles of construction, however, are subject to certain
limiting rules. One is the presumption against preemption of state law in an
area-traditionally under state police power control. See Jones v. Rath Packing
Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). Another is that statutes in derogation of common
law rights should be strictly construed. See Checkrite Petroleum, Inc. v.
Amoco Oil Co., 678 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1982). Such restrictive rules, like those
liberal ones stated above, are subservient to the overriding objective of ascer-
taining, through sensitive and enlightened reasoning, exactly what the enact-
ing Congress really intended. The Supreme Court has indicated that the
general assumption against preemption of police powers is subordinate to the
principle that the true intent of Congress controls, "whether Congress' com-
mand is explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly contained in its
structure and purpose." Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)
(citations omitted). More specifically, as the Court observed in Jamison v. En-
carnacion, 281 U.S. 635 (1920), the extent of the FELA's alteration of the com-
mon law "is not to be narrowed by refined reasoning." Id. at 640.
73. This theory refers to the inference that by expressing only one stan-
dard, duty, or prohibition, a legislature intended to exclude all others from the
scope of the legislation. See Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17
(1980) ("Where Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general
prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evi-
dence of a contrary legislative intent."); see also Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416, 427
(3d Cir. 1974) (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (arguing that a legislature's provision
for a private cause of action in one title of an act indicates that such a remedy
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on the theory in this instance is particularly susceptible to criti-
cism. There are several explanations for the failure of Con-
gress explicitly to bar railroad property damage claims when
enacting the core of the FELA in 1906 and 1908. None of them
leads necessarily to the conclusion that Congress's silence was
tantamount to a conscious decision to permit such claims, a con-
clusion that would violate both reason and the policies underly-
ing the FELA.
A. THE EXISTENCE AND IMPACT OF EMPLOYER PROPERTY
DAMAGE CLAIMS AT COMMON LAW
In Cavanaugh, the court stated that common law allowed
an employer to recover affirmatively from an employee for
negligently caused property damage74 In order to justify its ap-
plication of expressio unius, however, it also must have as-
sumed implicitly that Congress knew of the right when it
adopted the FELA and that it could predict the consequences of
permitting the right in FELA actions. Congress could not in-
tend to preserve what did not exist, was not known to exist, or
was not expected to develop. Each assumption, therefore, bears
critical examination; if any proves unjustified, the expressio
unius chain of reasoning is broken.
Pre-FELA cases and treatises reveal that the employer's
property damage claim was not prominent as an independent or
affirmative basis for recovery. Blackstone's Commentaries do
not even mention the possibility of a master's claim against a
servant for property damage caused by the servant's negli-
gence.7 5 Even in later periods of common law development,
is unavailable under another title that is silent on the issue), rev'd, 422 U.S. 66
(1975).
74. Cavanaugh, 729 F.2d at 290-91. The Washington Supreme Court also
has asserted that the employer's claim against negligent employees existed at
common law. See Stack v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R., 94 Wash. 2d 155, 158,
615 P.2d 457, 459 (1980) (en banc).
75. The Commentaries, however, were quite clear in addressing the
master's responsibility for injuries caused by servants to third persons:
[Iun all the cases here put, the master may be frequently a loser by
the trust reposed in his servant, but never can be a gainer; he may
frequently be answerable for his servant's misbehavior, but never can
shelter himself from punishment by laying the blame on his agent.
The reason of this is still uniform and the same; that the wrong done
by the servant is looked upon in law as the wrong of the master him-
self; and it is a standing maxim, that no man shall be allowed to make
any advantage of his own wrong.
1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *432. Apparently, there was little pressure
for actions by the master against the servant because of this philosophical im-
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this supposed common law claim escaped the attention of sev-
eral comprehensive treatises.1 6 An implied common law con-
tract action for property damage began to surface, albeit
without much precedential support, only in the late 1800's with
the emergence of true industry and a mass competitive labor
force.
Early case law indicates that the common law only tenta-
tively embraced an employer's right to proceed against an em-
ployee for negligently caused property damage. Such actions
certainly did not have the prominence of common law defenses
such as contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, or fel-
low servant negligence. Usually, the employer was limited to
the defensive benefit of setting off some amount against the
employee's recovery in a suit for wages. For example, in GLen-
putation of a shared master-servant identity and, more importantly, because of
the nonindustrial nature of the labor market and the related unlikelihood that
servants would either have or ever expect to have wealth that could be placed
at risk.
76. The property damage action by employer against employee is not even
mentioned in the discussions of the master-servant relationship in several au-
thoritative treatises. See, e.g., 2 W. ODGERS, ODGERS ON THE COMMON LAW OF
ENGLAND 213-27 (3d ed. 1927); H. STEPHEN, 2 STEPHEN'S COMMiENTARIES ON
THE LAws OF ENGLAND 43541 (L. Warmington ed. 1950). A vague reference to
this action, however, does appear in J. SMRTH, SMITH'S COMMON LAw 454 (9th
ed. 1880) (asserting that "if [the servant's] work has been productive of injury
rather than benefit, he is liable to an action").
In subtle contrast to this issue of an employee's liability to an employer
for negligent property damage is the issue of the employer's right, by way of
indemnification, to recover from the employee the cost of a judgment obtained
by a third party against the employer on account of the employee's negligence.
In such circumstances, the controversy goes beyond the labor relationship it-
self. It generally is regarded that the liability of employees in this situation is
primary and that the master-servant relationship does not absolve employees
of their duties as against the world. See H. S ITH, ADDISON ON CONTRACTS 448
(8th ed. 1888). This legal conclusion is significant because the employees often
are covered by insurance, which serves as an indemnification fund. See, e.g.,
United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 172 F.2d 836, 845 (9th Cir. 1949). In
the absence of insurance, employees usually are judgment-proof.
In one FELA case a court upheld the impleader of fellow workers by the
railroad on an indemnification theory. Greenleaf v. Huntingdon & Broad Top
Mtn_ PR & Coal Co., 3 F.LD. 24, 24-25 (E.D. Pa. 1942). Even this practice,
however, runs counter to 45 U.S.C. § 60 (1982), which prohibits "[a]ny contract,
rule, regulation, or device" that prevents employees from volunteering infor-
mation about an accident to a party in interest. See intfni text accompanying
notes 157-78. In another, non-FELA, case the court precluded the employer's
insurance carrier from recovering against a worker for injury to a third party
because the worker fell within the coverage of the insurance policy. Builders




non v. Lebanon Manufacturing Co.,77 an 1891 Pennsylvania
case, a machinist sued his employer in assumpit for wages. The
employer claimed a setoff for the employee's negligent damage
to the employer's property.78 The court wrestled with the com-
mon law nature of such a setoff only to conclude that it was "an
equitable defense, growing out of the contract itself, and going
directly to its consideration."79 The court reasoned: "Surely, if
my servant sue me for wages, I may show as a defense to his
claim that he has been unfaithful, negligent, or dishonest, or
that he wasted or embezzled my property."80 The court never
discussed any affirmative recovery or claim pursuant to the
common law.81
Cases suggesting that an employer could recover affirma-
tively from an employee for negligently caused property dam-
age typically introduce statutes or rules that go beyond the
77. 140 Pa. 594, 21 A. 429 (1891).
78. Id. at 595, 21 A. at 429.
79. Icl at 600, 21 A. at 429.
80. Idc at 601, 21 A. at 430.
81. Another example of the employer's contract-based action is Zulkie v.
Wing, 20 Wis. 429 (1866). The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Zulkie, without
reference to any precedent, permitted an employer to recoup the value of a
team of horses negligently destroyed by an employee against the amount due
to the employee in his suit for wages. The court observed: "It would be
strange if the servant, in answer to such an action, could say: 'Respondeat su-
perior. I was your servant at the time of the injury; my act was your act, my
negligence your negligence; and therefore you cannot recover.'" Id. at 432.
But cf. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 75, at *432 (noting that since the wrong
of the servant is the wrong of the master, the master may frequently be a
loser but never a gainer "by the trust reposed in his servant.") The Wisconsin
Supreme Court may have been motivated as much by the social pressures
favoring industrialization as by the fact that a worker's suit for wages created
a handy "fund" from which such costs could be deducted.
For other cases involving employers' claims against employees, see Steb-
bins v. Waterhouse, 58 Conn. 370, 20 A. 480 (1890) (separate suit for misappro-
priation of mule and buckboard by defendant servant for his own use); Parker
v. Platt, 74 Ill. 430, 432 (1874) (employer can recoup damages sustained as a
result of employee's lack of skill and care in performing work); Selley v.
American Lubricator Co., 119 Iowa 591, 93 N.W. 590 (1903) (same); Hudson v.
Feige, 58 Mich. 148, 24 N.W. 863 (1885) (same); Alberts v. Stearns, 50 Mich.
349, 352, 15 N.W. 505, 506 (1883) (employee's lack of diligence in performing
work can act as reduction or bar to recovery of damages from termination);
Dunlap v. Hand, 26 Miss. 460, 461 (1853) (employer may set up negligence of
employer in discharging duties to defeat a recovery of wages or reduce the
amount owed); Alpaugh v. Wood, 53 N.J.L. 638, 23 A. 261 (N.J. 1891) (separate
suit for breach of management contract by defendants after the defendants
had prevailed in an action on the contract for their 10% of profits); Goskin v.
Hodson, 24 Vt. 140, 141 (1852) (employer's suffering greater loss than sum due
for services "will defeat" the employee's action); J. POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES
§ 608, at 983 & n.24 (5th ed. 1929) (discussing recoupment).
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common law in protecting the interests of employers.82 In
Harlan v. St Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Railway Co.,83 an
1884 Minnesota case, a railroad brakeman brought suit to re-
cover from the railroad for services rendered. The railroad al-
leged "by way of defense and counter-claim" that the employee
performed his job negligently, thereby causing property dam-
age.8 4 Although the Minnesota court did not reveal the precise
nature of the employee's negligence or the extent of the result-
ing damage, it did explain the common law rule underlying the
railroad's counterclaim:
It was well settled, upon common-law principles, that where the de-
fendant has sustained damages by reason of the plaintiff's non-per-
formance of his part of the agreement sued on, such defendant has
the right to abate the plaintiff's claim by the amount of such dam-
ages.... Damages incurred by the defendant through the negligence
of the plaintiff in the performance of the contract of employment
sued on, might be thus interposed by way of recoupment. ... Our
statute has extended this right so that now a defendant may plead
such damages, not merely in reduction or bar of plaintiff's claim, but
also so that if the balance be found in his favor he may have affirina-
tive judgment for the amount against the plaintiff . . 85
Harlan presented not a claim of an injured worker for personal
injuries, but rather a contractual defense that-but for a statu-
tory modification-merely would have reduced the employee's
recovery of wages due.86
82. In the absence of a special statute or rule, an employer's ability to re-
cover affirmatively on a counterclaim was nonexistent at common law. Prior
to the advent of code pleading, recoupment and setoff were the only methods
by which a defendant could raise a claim against a plaintiff. Recoupment was
available when the defendant possessed a right of recovery "confined to the
particular subject of litigation that gave rise to the suit." G. PHILLIPS, THE
PRINCIPLES OF CODE PLEADING § 371, at 412 (1932). It was not a cause of ac-
tion, but rather a "reduction of damages." Id at 41L Setoff, which derived
from English statutes and later became part of the American common law, al-
lowed the defendant to raise any liquidated, sum-certain contract demand. See
id. at 413-15. At common law, neither recoupment nor setoff would produce
an affirmative recovery. Id. at 413. Upon the adoption of code pleading, the
definitions and scope given to these procedures and to counterclaims, although
not always perfectly consistent, often allowed a wider range of affirmative re-
coveries. See id. at 417.
83. 31 Minn. 427, 18 N.W. 147 (1884).
84. Id. at 427, 18 N.W. at 147 (quoting defendant's answer).
85. Id. at 428, 18 N.W. at 147-48 (emphasis added).
86. Accord Mobile & Mont. Ry. v. Clanton, 59 Ala. 392 (1877). In Clanton,
the defendant railroad company raised a setoff for damage to its train against a
conductor who had sued only for wages due. This setoff procedure was intro-
duced by a state statute for "matters arising out of the plaintiff's breach of the
contract sued on." Id. at 398. Another state statute permitted affirmative re-
covery, not just a reduction of the claim for wages. See id. at 399. The court in
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In 1905, a year before the first passage of the FELA, the
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, also considered
an employer's counterclaim against an employee for property
loss. In Hagin v. Cayauga Lake Cement Co.,87 a night watch-
man sued for past-due wages, and his employer, a cement com-
pany, counterclaimed for damages to its boiler caused when it
overheated after the night watchman fell asleep on duty.88
Once again, the case did not involve personal injuries. Because
New York's procedural rules permitted only contract-based
counterclaims, the key issue in Hagin was whether the counter-
claim sounded in contract or tort.8 9 The court permitted the
counterclaim, deciding, as had courts in earlier cases,90 that the
employer's action was contractual because the duty Hagin
breached arose pursuant to his employment contract.9 1 Since
Cayuga Cement's counterclaim for $150.00 exceeded Hagin's
claim for only $12.05,92 the decision implies that the employer
could recover affirmatively from its employee for the negli-
gently caused property damage.
The employer's property damage claim, therefore, was con-
textually limited in pre-FELA common law.93 Even assuming
Clanton did not, however, cite any common law authority supporting the prop-
erty damage claim. In permitting the setoff, the court condemned employee
negligence without indicting the railroad industry in general, stating that
"negligence on the part of such agents, while running railroad trains, is almost
always but little less than a crime." Id. at 397.
87. 105 A.D. 269, 93 N.Y.S. 428 (1905).
88. Id. at 270, 93 N.Y.S. at 430.
89. Id. at 272, 93 N.Y.S. at 430. The holding of the lower court in Hagin,
as described in the syllabus of the appellate court's opinion, was that the as-
serted counterclaim for negligent property damage could not be raised in the
plaintiff's contract suit for wages because that counterclaim sounded in tort.
Id. at 269, 93 N.Y.S. at 429.
90. E.g., Jarrett Lumber Co. v. Reese, 66 Fla. 317, 318, 63 So. 581, 582
(1913); Weymer v. Belle Plaine Broom Co., 151 Iowa 541, 544, 132 N.W. 27, 29
(1911); Glennon v. Lebanon Mfg. Co., 140 Pa. 594, 594, 21 A. 429, 429 (1891); see
J. SMITH, supra note 76, at 453.
91. Hagin, 105 App. Div. at 273, 93 N.Y.S. at 430.
92. Id. at 270, 93 N.Y.S. at 429.
93. None of the cases found presented an employer's claim or counter-
claim for property damage against a worker who received work-related inju-
ries. The case of Doremus v. Root, 23 Wash. 710, 63 P. 572 (1901), cited in
support of a common law action against an employee for property damage in
Stack v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R., 94 Wash. 2d 155, 157, 615 P.2d 457, 459
(1980), actually was a suit by an injured railroad fireman against both the rail-
road company and the conductor who failed to pull his train off to a siding to
avoid a collision. Doremus, 23 Wash. at 711-12, 63 P. at 572-73. The jury
awarded damages against the railroad only. Id. at 713, 63 P. at 573. Because
the jury absolved the conductor, the Washington Supreme Court ordered that
judgment be entered for the railroad as well. Id. at 723, 63 P. at 576.
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that Congress was aware of these cases, it could not anticipate
that such claims, raised exclusively in employees' suits for
wages and often influenced by state statutes, would expand into
a defensive action in employees' suits for injury and death. As
a purely procedural matter, Congress had little reason to ex-
pect in 1906 and 1908 that setoffs sounding in assumpsit could
be raised against injured workers suing in trespass on the
case.94 Moreover, the prevalence of the contributory negligence
bar in pre-FELA common law also explains Congress's failure
to enact an express prohibition of employers' property damage
counterclaims in FELA suits. If the FELA plaintiff proved that
any employer negligence contributed to the employee's injury
or death, common law presumably would bar the employer's
property damage claim.9s Although an FELA plaintiff might
fail to prove such employer negligence, thereby eliminating the
contributory negligence bar, the probability that Congress en-
gaged in this process of reasoning seems miniscule in the ab-
sence of any support in the record.96
Consequently, the expressio unius doctrine cannot fairly
imply that Congress intended to allow the railroad property
damage counterclaims in FELA actions. Historical analysis
proves that employer claims raised under pre-FELA common
law differed significantly from those presently asserted by rail-
roads. Congress could not have anticipated the development or
94. See supra note 82.
95. As the House Judiciary Committee pointed out, "The United States
has adhered much closer to the common-law doctrine of contributory negli-
gence than the leading countries in Europe." H.R. REP. No. 1386, 60th Cong.,
1st Sess. 5 (1908). The Committee did note, however, that Maryland and some
other states had enacted comparative negligence statutes. Id.
In Kentucky & Ind. Terminal R.R. v. Martin, 437 S.W.2d 944 (Ky. 1969),
the railroad property damage counterclaim to an FELA action had been dis-
missed in light of the jury's finding that the railroad was 70% negligent and
Martin was 30% negligent. See id- at 951. The appellate court, in affirming the
dismissal, observed.
The usual common-law rule is applicable insofar as the railroad's
claim against Martin [the plaintiff] is concerned, so that the railroad's
contributory negligence would bar its claim against Martin. It is only
by virtue of the provisions of the FELA that Martin's claim is not
barred by his contributory negligence.
Id.
96. By turn-of-the-century standards, in virtually any nonfrivolous FELA
action the contributory negligence bar would prevent a counterclaim. Modern
state comparative negligence statutes and state law doctrines that prevent
treating a fellow servant's negligence as contributory negligence of the em-
ployer, however, now threaten completely unforeseeable and dramatic intru-
sions on the FELA. See infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
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impact of modern property damage claims even had it been
aware of the claims' limited common law existence. Moreover,
as explained below, permitting such counterclaims is at odds
with the overriding remedial purpose of the FELA.
B. THE EFFECT OF EMPLOYER PROPERTY DAMAGE CLAIMS ON
CONGRESS'S COMPREHENSIVE AND BALANCED
LIABILITY PROGRAM
When Congress enacted, reenacted, and amended the
FELA, its goal was to design a remedial statute to address im-
portant social problems affecting interstate commerce.9 7 When
Congress undertakes such a task but neither takes into account
nor specifically precludes state laws that inhibit the statute's
goals, the constitutional mandate of federal supremacy 98 still
demands that the congressional design prevail over the state
laws.99 The FELA, intended to operate uniformly in all
states,o00 therefore preempts any state laws in conflict with its
purpose.lO'
97. See supra notes 18-25 and accompanying text.
98. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, cl. 2.
99. Examples of the preemption of specific state statutes by a general fed-
eral policy are numerous. In City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.,
411 U.S. 624 (1973), for instance, a local antinoise ordinance precluding aircraft
takeoffs between 11:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. was struck down because of interfer-
ence with the general federal legislative and regulatory program to control na-
tional air traffic flow. Although recognizing that "[c]ontrol of noise is of
course deep-seated in the police power of the States," id at 638, the Court held
that the local ordinance placed an unacceptable burden on the Federal Avia-
tion Administration's power to control uniformly the broader subject of na-
tional air traffic flow. I&. The Court noted that even sporadic and seemingly
incidental state interference could be disruptive of uniformity. Id. at 639.
Thus, although there was no explicit federal statutory prohibition of the local
antinoise ordinance, it nonetheless succumbed to federal preemption. Four
years later, in Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977), a California reg-
ulation requiring net weight labeling of flour was held to be preempted by the
federal Fair Packaging and Labeling Act. The Court observed that if the state
regulation were upheld, national manufacturers would have to overpack to al-
low for moisture loss due to longer delivery times. Id. at 543. As a result, the
state regulation was preempted, even in the absence of any express prohibition
against it in the federal statute, because it threatened to disturb the congres-
sional objective of establishing a uniform basis for solid content, as opposed to
net weight, comparisons. Id at 540-43; see also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) (federal preemption of state law by the United
States Warehouse Act).
100. See New York Cent. R.R. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147, 150 (1917).
101. See, e.g., id. at 151-54 (FELA preempts application of New York Work-
men's Compensation Act to injury suffered by railroad worker); Second Em-
ployers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 56-59 (1912) (FELA enforceable in state
courts despite conflicting state statutes).
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If permitted in FELA suits, the railroads' state law prop-
erty damage claims would interfere extensively with the Act's
objectives. Examining the effect of such claims on the FELA's
comparative negligence provisionO2 demonstrates this interfer-
ence. That provision was added in 1908, replacing the prior
qualified contributory negligence bar.103 A House Judiciary
Committee report explained the rationale for the replacement:
[Tihis bill is a very great improvement on [the contributory negli-
gence] doctrine for the reason that it imposes the burden of the em-
ployer's negligence on the employer, and he will thus be induced to
exercise higher care in the selection of his employees, and in other
ways, for the safety of persons in his employment. If the law imposes
on the employee the burden of his own negligence, that is certainly
sufficient, and that is what this section seeks to do .... l04
This provision thus resulted from a careful balancing of the eq-
uities in view of the purposes of the Act. Imposing liability on
the railroad in proportion to its own negligence and that of
other workers was intended to encourage railroad safety. In
this balance, reducing the FELA award in proportion to the in-
jured worker's negligence was a "sufficient" burden for the em-
ployee to bear.
To illustrate the disruption to this balance that occurs
when an FELA defendant railroad counterclaims for property
damage, consider a situation in which an injured worker and
the railroad both are fifty percent negligent and the jury as-
sesses damages for the employee's injury at $500,000. In the ab-
sence of a property damage counterclaim, the injured worker
would recover half of $500,000, or $250,000, from the railroad.
A radically different result occurs, however, if the railroad as-
serts and proves that the same negligence resulted in $500,000
102. 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1982).
103. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
104. H.R. REP. No. 1386, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1908). The Senate Com-
mittee on Education and Labor also emphasized the need to avoid placing an
intolerable burden on negligent workers:
Everybody understands that our railway workmen do their work in
the constant presence of danger, where a single misstep is often fatal.
They are, almost without exception, intelligent and capable men.
They are, as a rule, the heads of families, and there is nothing ex-
treme or revolutionary in the opinion that the whole community
should share with them and their families the loss which arises from
an accident which befalls one of them. The present proposal . . is
intended in case the accident arises from the joint negligence of the
employee and the employer, requiring the jury to determine the pro-
portion of damages due to the negligence of each, diminishing the
amount of its verdict in a sum equal to that portion of damage which
arises from the negligence of the employee.
S. REP. No. 460, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1908).
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in property damage.105 Even if the applicable state comparative
negligence law reduces the railroad's recovery in proportion to
its own negligence,106 the property damage claim offsets the
FELA recovery.
Assuming the same damage figures, in a case in which a
plaintiff is fifty percent negligent and proves that a co-worker
also is fifty percent negligent, the plaintiff's recovery on the
FELA claim once again would be $250,000. If the state law
under which a property damage counterclaim arises recognizes
joint and several liability,107 however, the railroad may be le-
gally entitled to obtain full recovery of its $500,000 property
loss from the FELA plaintiff. This occurs if state law prohibits
imputing the negligence of an employee to the employer when
the employer raises its own claim.108 The employer's judgment
against the FELA plaintiff, of course, probably could be satis-
fied only to the extent of the plaintiff's recovery against the
railroad; that recovery is exactly what made the FELA plaintiff
105. A railroad's actual property damage claim conceivably could be for a
much larger amount than $500,000. See, e.g., Cavanaugh v. Western Maryland
Ry., 729 F.2d 289, 290 (4th Cir. 1984) (property damage claim for $1.7 million);
Stack v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R., 94 Wash. 2d 155, 157, 615 P.2d 457, 458
(1980) (property damage claim for $1.5 million).
106. A railroad's property damage claim is grounded in state common law
and, therefore, subject to the state's rules apportioning damages in negligence
suits even if the FELA claim was brought in federal court. See Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1937) (application of substantive state law in federal
courts). The state is more likely to have a comparative negligence statute than
a contributory negligence bar. See H. WOODS, COMPARATIVE FAULT: THE NEG-
LIGENCE CASE § 1:11, at 24-28 (1978). A few comparative fault states still would
bar the railroad's recovery under these facts, however, because the railroad
was 50% negligent, while others would not bar the railroad's claim unless it
was more than 50% negligent. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
§ 3.5(B), at 75 & nn.51-52 (1974). The 50% figure is used here only for simplic-
ity's sake; innumerable other configurations of figures could be assigned with
similar results.
107. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 106, § 3.5(C), at 80 (noting that some
comparative negligence states retain the principle of joint and several liabil-
ity). But see Comment, Doctrine of Common Law Indemnity Abolished in
Negligence Cases as Inconsistent with the Comparative Negligence and Contri-
bution Statute, 12 ST. MARY'S L. REV. 769 (1981) (comment on B & B Auto
Supply, Sand Pit, & Trucking Co. v. Central Freight Lines, Inc., 603 S.W.2d 814
(Tex. 1980)).
108. Some states do not permit an employee's negligence to be imputed to
the suing employer. See, e.g., Brown v. Poritzky, 30 N.Y.2d 289, 292-93, 283
N.E.2d 751, 753, 332 N.Y.S.2d 872, 875 (1972); Zulkie v. Wing, 20 Wis. 429, 431-32
(1866). Contra Capitola v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. R.R., 258 Minn. 206,
208-09, 103 N.W.2d 867, 869 (1960). Results similar to those described in the
text would flow from a successful property damage claim by the employer
whether such a state is a comparative or contributory negligence jurisdiction.
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vulnerable to an enforceable judgment. Because the negligent
co-worker has achieved no recovery, any rights of contribution
possessed by the FELA plaintiff against the co-worker would
be of little value. Notably, it does not matter whether the state
allowing a property loss counterclaim has adopted comparative
negligence or still treats contributory negligence as a bar. In
either case the railroad has not been negligent in any way
under state law.
These computations, all flowing from the application of
fairly ordinary principles of state tort law, indicate the disrup-
tion to the FELA's comparative negligence scheme caused by
the introduction of the railroads' property damage counter-
claim. The FELA's application of comparative negligence prin-
ciples, however, is not the only example of a provision the
purpose of which is upset by allowing such a counterclaim. An-
other is the proviso in the comparative negligence section stat-
ing "[t]hat no such employee who may be injured or killed shall
be held to have been guilty of contributory negligence in any
case where the violation by such common carrier of any statute
enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or
death of such employee."109 This prohibition against consider-
ing the worker's negligence, of course, would not apply to a
purely state law property damage claim. Such a claim conse-
quently could offset the FELA recovery of a contributorily neg-
ligent worker even if the railroad violated a safety statute. This
result directly conflicts with Congress's firm intention to pre-
vent railroads from escaping FELA liability when the violation
of a safety statute contributed to the worker's injury or death
and squarely defeats the railroads' statutory incentive to com-
ply with safety acts.
Interference with the FELA's purpose does not result
solely from the counterclaim procedure for raising negligence-
based property damage claims. Conceivably, railroads could file
property damage claims in separate state law actions. Indeed,
the three-year FELA statute of limitationsilo may induce rail-
roads facing shorter limitations periods for their state claimsn'
to initiate first strikes. Consistent with the Supreme Court's
109. 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1982).
110. Id.
111. For a listing of states with a torts statute of limitations of less than
three years, see McGovern, The Status of Statutes of Limitations and Statutes




pronouncement in Migra v. Board of Education,112 the disposi-
tion of such state law claims could bar later FELA suits under
the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel to the ex-
tent that the state courts themselves would apply those doc-
trines in a subsequent action brought in state court.113
More practically, a railroad's first filing could force the
prospective FELA plaintiff to raise the FELA as a counterclaim
to the railroad's state law action to prevent the preclusion of
the FELA claim. Such defensive actions could occur whether
the railroad filed in state court or in federal court. Regardless
of the railroad's filing situs, Congress's intention to permit
FELA plaintiffs to choose the legal forum would be soundly de-
feated. On the one hand, if the employer files first in federal
court, the congressional aim, embodied in the FELA's removal
prohibition,114 to permit FELA claimants to litigate in state
courts if they so desire is thwarted.115 On the other hand, if a
nondiverse employer files first in state court, no generally ac-
cepted principle permits the FELA counterclaimant to remove
the action to federal court."16
Thus, a state law cause of action for property damage,
112. 104 S. Ct. 892, 896-98 (1984) (holding that a state court judgment has
the same preclusive effect when the plaintiff attempts to bring a subsequent
claim in federal court as it would if the plaintiff tried to do so in state court).
113. Presumably, the Federal Full Faith and Credit Statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738 (1982), requires that these principles be applied in FELA suits to the
extent that state courts would apply them in a similar setting under state law.
In Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980), the Supreme Court applied § 1738 to
subject a plaintiff suing under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982), to state collateral estoppel principles. The plaintiff claimed at his state
criminal trial that police had violated his fourth amendment rights in con-
ducting an illegal search. See 449 U.S. at 91-93. The plaintiff, foreclosed from
habeas corpus relief for fourth amendment claims by Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
405 (1976), followed the only remaining course and filed suit under § 1983. See
449 U.S. at 93-94. In holding that state collateral estoppel principles were ap-
plicable to a civil rights claim, possibly binding a § 1983 plaintiff to the result
in a previous state criminal trial, id. at 103-05, the Court revealed the broad
scope of the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata, indicating the in-
evitability of their application in the FELA context.
114. 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a) (1982).
115. Of course, a defendant cannot "remove" a case to state court. A
worker or representative bringing an FELA counterclaim, therefore, would be
forced to litigate the claim in federal court even if a state forum was preferred.
116. The railroad's action does not arise under federal law, and authorities
are divided as to whether a counterclaimant can remove an action to federal
court when the counterclaim arises under federal law. C. WRIGHT, supra note
3, at 203 (citing divided authorities); see Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets,
313 U.S. 100, 108 (1941) (plaintiff unable to remove when defendant filed coun-
terclaim that otherwise could have been brought in federal court).
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whether raised by a counterclaim or by a separate action, dis-
turbs virtually every aspect of Congress's careful balancing of
the railroads' and employees' responsibility for negligence.
Congress could not have intended to permit such a dramatic al-
teration of its remedial plan by state law remedies the exist-
ence and nature of which were doubtful when the FELA was
adopted.117 The congressional design therefore demands that
state law property damage claims be preempted by the FELA.
That the FELA impliedly forecloses certain state law rem-
edies is not a novel idea. Not long after passage of the FELA,
the Supreme Court established that the Act foreclosed even
those state law remedies more favorable than the FELA to the
injured employee. In the 1917 case of New York Central Rail-
road Co. v. Winfield,118 the most dramatic example of this pre-
clusion, an interstate railroad worker laying cross ties lost an
eye when struck by a bounding pebble.119 Since no railroad or
co-worker negligence contributed to the accident, the worker
was precluded from recovering damages under the FELA.o
The worker sought relief instead under the New York Work-
man's Law, which did not require employer negligence for re-
covery.121 The Court, however, held that the FELA's
regulation was so comprehensive as to preclude state remedies,
even though the FELA provided no relief for this injured
worker:
[Tihe reports of the congressional committees having the bill in
charge disclose, without any uncertainty, that it was intended to be
very comprehensive, to withdraw all injuries to railroad employees in
interstate commerce from the operation of varying state laws and to
apply to them a national law having a uniform operation throughout
all the States . 122
Those state remedies more favorable to railroad workers killed
or injured on the job thus were sacrificed to the congressional
design of establishing a uniform body of national law providing
relief to such workers.23
117. See supra notes 74-96 and accompanying text.
118. 244 U.S. 147 (1917).
119. I& at 148.
120. Ic- at 148-49.
121. See i& at 148.
122. Id at 150. Elsewhere the court stated that the FELA was "compre-
hensive and also exclusive." Id at 151.
123. In another FELA preemption case, Mondou v. New York, NIL & R.
IR., 223 U.S. 1, 53-54 (1912), the Supreme Court quoted Chief Justice John
Marshall's opinion in the famous case of McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 405-06, 426 (1819), to emphasize the superiority of federal law and
policy. The Court in Mondou then explained:
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As a direct consequence of this wide-ranging preemption,
workers covered by the FELA are also discriminated against in
comparison to tort victims among the public at large. In the
event of a worker's death, for example, courts have limited re-
covery under the FELA to the worker's pain and suffering and
the designated beneficiaries' pecuniary loss reduced to present
worth.124 Beneficiaries may recover as pecuniary loss only the
amount that they would have received from the decedent if he
or she had lived.125 This amount can be drastically less than
the amount the deceased worker would have earned over an
entire career minus the cost of personal maintenance-a mea-
sure of recovery frequently permitted under more modern state
survival statutes.126 Moreover, FELA plaintiffs, unlike plain-
tiffs suing under some state statutes, cannot recover such items
True, prior to the present act the laws of the several States were
regarded as determinative of the liability of employers engaged in in-
terstate commerce for injuries received by their employ6s while en-
gaged in such commerce. But that was because Congress, although
empowered to regulate that subject, had not acted thereon, and be-
cause the subject is one which falls within the police power of the
states in the absence of action by Congress. . . . The inaction of Con-
gress, however, in no wise affected its power over the subject ...
And now that Congress has acted, the laws of the States, in so far as
they cover the same field, are superseded, for necessarily that which
is not supreme must yield to that which is.
223 U.S. at 54-55 (citations omitted). Thus, the Court eliminated the possibility
of an FELA plaintiff's taking advantage of certain favorable state remedies
even though the Act itself did not explicitly bar their use.
124. The Supreme Court, in Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59
(1913), assumed that the FELA limited the amount of recovery to "proper
compensation for the loss of any pecuniary benefit which would reasonably
have been derived . . . from the decedent's earnings." Id. at 72-73; see also
Dow v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 165 F.2d 777, 779 (3d Cir. 1948) ("The
'benefit' is the amount which the jury finds the dead man would have given to
his wife and other dependents had he lived."). Three years after Vreeland, the
Court further required that recovery attributable to a loss of future expected
benefits be reduced to the amount that would reproduce the future economic
expectancy if invested at the time of the verdict. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v.
Kelly, 241 U.S. 485, 489-91 (1916). As a result of the 1910 FELA amendment,
Pub. L. No. 61-117, sec. 2, § 9, 36 Stat. 291, 291 (1910) (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 59
(1982)), the plaintiff in a death action also may recover for pain and suffering
of the deceased between the injury and death, see St. Louis Iron Mtn. & S. Ry.
Co. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648, 657-61 (1915).
125. See Michigan Cent. R.R., 227 U.S. at 70.
126. See Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 299, 307-09, 282 A.2d 206, 229 (1971)
(damages recoverable in Pennsylvania survival action equal decedent's esti-
mated future earning power less estimated cost of personal maintenance, re-
duced to present value), overrruled in part, Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 491 Pa.
561, 583, 421 A.2d 1027, 1038-39 (1980) (permitting consideration of victim's lost
future productivity but abandoning Incollingo practice of discounting lost fu-
ture earnings to present value).
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as funeral expenses 2 7 and punitive damages in cases of
recklessness.m
The consequences of preempting FELA plaintiffs' state law
remedies provide an indispensable guide in determining
whether the Act similarly preempts railroads' state law prop-
erty damage claims. The FELA's purpose is to protect railroad
workers;329 it does not purport to protect railroad equipment
and other property, nor can such a policy logically be inferred
from it. To regard the FELA as sufficiently comprehensive to
preempt state remedies more protective of workers while al-
lowing property damage claims to survive unscathed is inequi-
table and inconsistent with the Act's purpose. Having reaped
the benefit of preemption of state law remedies favorable to
employees, the railroads should have to pay the price of pre-
emption of those state law remedies favorable to them. The
FELA establishes the most plenary regulation, balancing rail-
road and employee responsibility for work-related injuries. In
this balance, the railroad is denied specified common law de-
fenses to FELA actions but is relieved of state law responsibili-
ties more exacting than the FELA. This balance leaves no
room for the newly discovered property damage counterclaim.
III. REFUTING THE THEORY OF CONGRESS'S
"INATTENTION" TO THE RAILROADS'
PROPERTY DAMAGE COUNTERCLAIM
IN THE FELA: THE "NO
CONTRACT-NO DEVICE" PROHIBITION AND ITS
SETOFF EXCEPTION
Thus far, this Article has assumed that Congress was silent
as to the railroads' ability to assert counterclaims for property
damage in FELA suits. Accepting that assumption, of course,
does not mean that Congress intended to permit such counter-
claims in FELA actions. A direct analysis of Congress's "inat-
tention," however, reveals that the assumption itself is not
127. Compare Dubose v. Kansas City S. Ry., 729 F.2d 1026, 1033 (5th Cir.
1984) (funeral expenses not recoverable under FELA), cert denied, 105 S. Ct.
179 (1984) with 42 PA. STAT. ANN. § 8301(c) (Purdon Supp. 1984) (specifically
allowing recovery for funeral expenses in wrongful death actions).
128. Compare Kozar v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 449 F.2d 1238 1240-43 (6th
Cir. 1971) (punitive damages not recoverable under FELA) with Harvey v.
Hassinger, 315 Pa. Super. 97, 461 A.2d 814, 816-17 (1983) (allowing punitive
damages pursuant to state survival statute in situations in which decedents
could have recovered them had they lived).
129. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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valid. On the contrary, the "no contract-no device" prohibition
and its setoff exception confirm that Congress intended to bar
all defensive tactics, including property damage counterclaims
by railroads in FELA actions.
A. THE "No CONTRACT-No DEVICE" PROHIBITION
In reaction to the railroads' growing practice of obtaining
contractual exoneration from liability to employees injured or
killed in railroad accidents,130 Congress expressly admonished
in the 1906 FELA that "no contract of employment, insurance,
relief benefit, or indemnity for injury or death ... shall consti-
tute any bar or defense to any [FELA] action."131 This provi-
sion guarded railroad workers against a multitude of threats to
FELA recoveries. By preventing contract-related bars or de-
fenses from having any judicial effect on the FELA's liability
design, Congress protected its interest in compensating employ-
ees and their families for injury and death and in encouraging
railroad safety improvements.132 The breadth of matters con-
demned in this "no contract" section evidences Congress's in-
tent to prohibit all known and potential liability-avoidance
techniques permitted under common law.
By its very terms, this 1906 prohibition superseded any
common law right of employers to assert property damage
counterclaims in employees' personal injury actions. As dis-
cussed earlier, employers asserted pre-FELA property damage
claims exclusively as setoffs, recoupments, or counterclaims in
employees' suits for wages.133 Court decisions examining the
common law basis of these claims agreed on one essential point:
the employer's claim derived from the employment contract.134
At this stage of common law development, Congress could an-
130. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
131. FELA, Pub. L. No. 59-219, § 3, 34 Stat. 232, 232 (1906) (emphasis ad-
ded) (reenacted in amended form and codified at 45 U.S.C. § 55 (1982)).
132. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 77-92 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. For example, in Glen-
non v. Lebanon Mfg. Co., 140 Pa. 594, 21 A. 429 (1891), the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court described the employer's claim as an "equitable defense" stem-
ming from the employment contract. Id. at 600, 21 A. at 429. Other cases de-
scribed the claim as originating in an implied contract by which workers
warranted that they would use ordinary skill and care in performing their du-
ties. See, e.g., Weymer v. Belle Plaine Broom Co., 151 Iowa 541, 547, 132 N.W.
27, 29 (1911) (continuing to express this theory after the passage of the FELA).
Courts going beyond the contract defense theory relied on state statutes, not
common law. See supra notes 82-92 and accompanying text.
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ticipate, at most,135 that courts also would characterize any sim-
ilar claims asserted in employees' personal injury suits as
contract defenses, and it provided for such contingencies by
banning all contract bars and defenses in FELA suits.
In the 1908 FELA reenactment, Congress extended the "no
contract" prohibition to include "[a]ny contract, rule, regula-
tion, or device whatsoever, the purpose or intent of which shall
be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself from any
[FELA] liability."136 Although this section no longer contained
the 1906 provision's "bar or defense" language, Congress could
not have intended to reinstate contractual bars and defenses to
FELA liability.37 On the contrary, Congress sought to expand
the prohibitions beyond those expressed in 1906.138 The 1906
prohibition of contract-related defenses thus was reasserted in
the 1908 "no contract-no device" provision, albeit in slightly dif-
ferent language.
The majority in Cavanaugh, in holding that the "contract
... or device" language did not prohibit a railroad's property
damage counterclaim, failed to recognize that the closest ances-
tor of the modern property damage counterclaim in pre-FELA
common law was rooted in contract.139 Rather, the court held
that "device" referred only to the attempts of railroads to "ex-
empt" or excuse themselves from liability and that "a counter-
claim by the railroad for its own damages is plainly not an
'exempt[ion] ... from any liability' and is thus not a 'device'
within the contemplation of Congress."140 Under this algebraic
analysis, however, neither are most contracts, rules, and regula-
135. Whether Congress could anticipate the railroad's property damage
claim at all is questionable. See supra notes 93-96.
136. FELA, Pub. L. No. 60-100, § 5, 35 Stat. 65, 66 (1908) (emphasis added)
(codified at 45 U.S.C. § 55 (1982)).
137. The House Judiciary Committee report on the 1908 FELA demon-
strates Congress's intent to prohibit the same problems that produced the 1906
"no contract" prohibition, in that much of the 1906 report describing the prob-
lem of employers' using contracts to escape liability was inserted verbatim into
the 1908 report. ILR. REP. No. 1386, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-8 (1908) (quoting
ER. REP. No. 2335, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1906)).
138. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
139. Cavanaugh v. Western Maryland Ry., 729 F.2d 289, 292 (4th Cir. 1984),
cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 222 (1984). The court tried to bolster its argument by
stating that it should not read into the FELA a prohibition "almost eighty
years after the FELA was originally enacted." rd. at 294. Alternatively, be-
cause those eighty years rarely saw the kind of counterclaim raised in Cava-
naugh and never saw it approved in any reported decision, it could be argued
that, after eighty years of FELA litigation without such claims, the "common
law" should not be used to create one.
140. Id. at 292.
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tions "exemptions" even though they preclude employee com-
pensation and eliminate the liability incentive for safety
improvements.
An even more basic flaw in the Cavanaugh court's reason-
ing is the assumption that Congress intended to prohibit only
those "devices" within its immediate contemplation. By adding
the "[a]ny . ..device whatsoever" clause, Congress attempted
to bar all future creative defenses that common law might
otherwise permit to defeat railroads' FELA liability.141 To ac-
complish this purpose, Congress adopted the broadest and most
open-ended language possible. This language consequently
should be interpreted to prohibit railroads' property damage
counterclaims in FELA suits.142 Allowing such claims enables
railroads to escape liability quite effectively by extinguishing
the FELA plaintiff's recovery. Such a result violates Congress's
intention to preclude all potential liability-avoidance
techniques.
The FELA's 1939 amendments reinforce the necessity of
interpreting the "no contract-no device" prohibition to apply to
the railroads' property damage counterclaims. The amend-
ments resulted from congressional frustration with courts' ap-
plying the assumption of risk defense when railroads had
issued a general notice of unsafe conditions.143 In reaction to
these "aggressions of courts,"144 Congress abolished the com-
mon law assumption of risk defense in FELA actions.'14 The
House Judiciary Committee report, however, maintained that
the amendment was unnecessary because the defense already
was barred by the "no contract-no device" provision: "[S]uch a
scheme of charging notice is a device to escape liability ...
[T]he prohibition of devices, regulations, and so forth, to defeat
liability covers a subject matter outside of relief associations,
against which the provisions. . . were mainly directed."146
The 1939 Judiciary Committee report thus confirms that
Congress intended the 1908 "no contract-no device" provision to
prohibit FELA defenses not yet envisioned. Specifically ban-
141. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49.
142. See Stack v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R., 94 Wash. 2d 155, 160-61. 615
P.2d 457, 460 (1980).
143. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
144. H.R. REP. No. 2153, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1938).
145. FELA, Pub. L. No. 76-382, sec. 1, § 1, 53 Stat. 1404, 1404 (1939) (codi-
fied at 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1982)).
146. H.R. REP. No. 1222, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1939) (repeating verbatim
H.R. REP. No. 2153, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 3 (1938)).
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ning the assumption of risk defense gave an annoyed Congress
the opportunity to flex its muscles against the recalcitrance of
lower courts. For courts to interpret narrowly the "no con-
tract-no device" prohibition is to place them in the same ob-
structionist position that provoked Congress's sharp response in
1939. No fair interpretation can ignore the expansive role Con-
gress assigned this prohibition.147
B. THE SETOFF EXCEPTION TO THE "No CONTRACT-NO
DEVICE" PROHIBITION
Closely related to the "no contract-no device" prohibition is
the prohibition's sole exception, which allows a railroad to set
off its contributions to insurance designed to compensate work-
ers for injury or death.148 This exception suggests two addi-
tional flaws in the Cavanaugh court's interpretation of the "no
contract-no device" prohibition. First, the setoff exception is
purposeless if, as the court in Cavanaugh maintained,149 the
prohibition itself applies only to technical exemptions from lia-
bility and not to setoffs. Second, Congress's exclusion of one
specific setoff from the "no contract-no device" prohibition im-
147. The Cavanaugh court also relied on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
13(a), relating to compulsory counterclaims, to conclude that Congress in-
tended to permit property damage counterclaims in FELA suits. 729 F.2d at
291; see supra note 72. Conceivably, Rule 13(a) could fall within the prohibi-
tion against "rules" also contained in the "no contract-no device" prohibition.
See supra text accompanying note 136. Although state rules evidently were
the primary object of the FELA's prohibition, various committee reports also
indicate general dissatisfaction with some legal rules applied by federal courts.
See infra note 166 and accompanying text; see also Radzanower v. Touche Ross
Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976) (observing that "a statute dealing with a narrow,
precise, and specific subject is not submerged by a later enacted statute cover-
ing a more generalized spectrum").
148. The setoff provision reads as follows:
Provided, That in any action brought against any such common car-
rier under or by virtue of any of the provisions of this Act, such com-
mon carrier may set off therein any sum it has contributed or paid to
any insurance, relief benefit, or indemnity that may have been paid to
the injured employee or the person entitled thereto on account of the
injury or death for which said action was brought.
45 U.S.C. § 55 (1982). This provision contains only minor editorial changes
from the 1906 version of the setoff exception:
Provided, however, That upon the trial of such action against any
common carrier the defendant may set off therein any sum it has con-
tributed toward any such insurance, relief benefit, or indemnity that
may have been paid to the injured employee, or, in case of his death,
to his personal representative.
FELA, Pub. L. No. 59-219, § 3, 34 Stat. 232, 232 (1906) (reenacted in amended
form and codified at 45 U.S.C. § 55 (1982)).
149. See supra text accompanying note 140.
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plies that Congress did not intend to except other forms of set-
off, including the common law equivalent of counterclaim, from
the prohibition's scope.150
The court in Cavanaugh maintained that the "no contract-
no device" prohibition applies only to contracts and devices that
permit railroads to "exempt" themselves from FELA liabil-
ity.151 By this view, a railroad's counterclaim falls outside the
prohibition because it does not prevent finding the railroad lia-
ble on the FELA claim; it affects only the amount of damages
the FELA plaintiff can recover from the railroad. Neither does
a railroad's claim for setoff seek to exempt the railroad from
FELA liability, however, since it also merely permits the rail-
road to reduce the plaintiff's recovery. Thus, under the Cava-
naugh analysis, Congress had no need to exclude railroad
setoffs for contributions to insurance and other compensatory
benefits from the "no contract-no device" prohibition. All set-
off claims were already excluded. Congress nonetheless did
adopt the narrow setoff exception to the 1906 "no contract"
prohibition152 and the 1908 "no contract-no device" prohibi-
tion 153 because it apparently believed that a specific exclusion
for a limited setoff was necessary to avoid the operation of the
prohibition. The setoff exception thus implies a result opposite
to that reached under the Cavanaugh analysis: all setoffs are
prohibited under the "no contract-no device" provision unless
otherwise excepted.
The legislative history of the setoff exception supports this
conclusion and further suggests that counterclaims were also
within the prohibition as the common law equivalent of setoffs.
In the 1906 congressional debates on the setoff exception, Sena-
150. This is, of course, an application of the expressio unius theory of statu-
tory construction. See supra note 73. The Cavanaugh court's reliance on this
theory to conclude that Congress intended to permit property damage counter-
claims in FELA suits was unjustified because the court did not ascertain Con-
gress's knowledge at the time it specifically excluded other defensive tactics,
see supra notes 74-96 and accompanying text, and did not reconcile its conclu-
sions with the intent underlying the FELA as a whole, see supra notes 97-129
and accompanying text. In applying the expressio unius canon in this situa-
tion, however, this Article examines the knowledge of Congress when it spe-
cifically excluded setoffs from the "no contract-no device" prohibition and
demonstrates how this exclusion, when viewed in light of the remedial pur-
pose of the FELA, implies coverage of other forms of setoff.
151. 729 F.2d at 292.
152. FELA, Pub. L. No. 59-219, § 3, 34 Stat. 232, 232 (1906) (reenacted in
amended form and codified at 45 U.S.C. § 55 (1982)).
153. FELA, Pub. L. No. 60-100, § 5, 35 Stat. 65, 66 (1908) (codified at 45
U.S.C. § 55 (1982)).
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FELA
tor Daniels, the FELA's Senate sponsor, argued forcefully
against allowing railroads to reduce FELA recovery for insur-
ance contributions, whether such reductions were called setoffs,
recoupments, or counterclaims:
As it would seem to me, Mr. President, (the setoff exception] is a
most incongruous and most perverted effort to interject into [an
FELA] action a plea of set-off that does not properly belong there.
... What is an offset, Mr. President? I read from Waterman on
Set Off, Recoupment and Counterclaim:
Set off signifies the subtraction or taking away of one demand
from another opposite or cross demand, so as to extinguish the
smaller demand and reduce the greater by the amount of the less;
or if the opposite demands are equal, to extinguish both.
This is a condensed definition of offset or set-off, but neither the
indemnity, the relief, the benefit, nor the insurance which is here au-
thorized to be pleaded as an offset answers to that definition.
Neither, Mr. President, would any equitable extension of the law of
offset, nor any definition of recoupment or counterclaim, which are
connate branches of the law of offset apply to such a case as this.25 4
The debate's broad discussion of setoffs, counterclaims, and re-
coupment produced a solitary exception for a narrow setoff,
thus indicating that Congress intended other types of setoffs to
be among the prohibited defenses and bars.
The property damage counterclaim is the product of pre-
FELA decisions' interchangeably terming an employer's action
in employee suits for wages as setoff, recoupment, and counter-
claim.155 The courts' procedural name for these actions is in-
consequential, however, because each procedure was merely a
"connate branch" of the same concept,156 and each was prohib-
ited under the 1906 "no contract" provision and the 1908 "no
contract-no device" provision. Congress, even if unaware of
these early property damage claims, excluded their product by
genus, if not by specific provision.
154. 40 CONG. REc. 7917 (1906) (statement of Sen. Daniel) (emphasis
added).
155. See cases cited supra note 81. Setoff was used more frequently than
counterclaim, perhaps because affirmative relief could not be had on counter-
claims at common law. See eg., M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 124
(1979); J. CoUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES &
MATERIALS 501-02 (3d ed. 1980).
156. See supra text accompanying note 154.
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IV. THE RAILROADS' PROPERTY DAMAGE CLAIM
AGAINST CO-WORKERS: THE MEANING OF
THE "FREE ACCESS" GUARANTEE
AND PROTECTING THE
VOLUNTARY FLOW OF EVIDENCE
Counterclaims are not the only manner in which railroads
can assert property damage claims against employees nor the
only procedural context in which such claims can frustrate the
FELA's provisions and purpose. As discussed above, a rail-
road's "first strike" action against a potential FELA plaintiff
can defeat Congress's intent to allow FELA plaintiffs to choose
the legal battlefield.157 A railroad's independent property dam-
age action against a co-worker of the FELA plaintiff, however,
can abolish the FELA's protections in a more fundamental way:
such claims may inhibit co-workers from volunteering informa-
tion necessary to establish an FELA suit.
The FELA, even though conceived as remedial legisla-
tion,158 is still grounded on the plaintiff's ability to prove at
least some negligence by the railroad or co-workers.150 Some
very practical consequences flow from this requirement. A
worker not mortally injured may be able to testify regarding
railroad or co-worker negligence. When the employee has no
personal knowledge or died as a result of the accident, how-
ever, the FELA plaintiff must investigate the accident indepen-
dently to obtain much of the necessary proof. The FELA
plaintiff is rarely as equipped to conduct an immediate inquiry
as is the railroad.160 Consequently, the evidence may become
stale and the accident difficult or impossible to reconstruct. In
these circumstances, information from co-workers is essential
for the plaintiff to prevail in the FELA action. If the railroad,
keeping its own investigatory files confidential,161 creates the
impression that it might retaliate against co-workers who admit
157. See supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
159. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1982); see supra note 30 and accompanying text.
160. A 1939 report by the Senate Judiciary Committee states:
The railroads maintain well-organized and highly efficient claim de-
partments. When an employee is injured, the claim agent promptly
endeavors to procure statements from all witnesses to the infliction of
the injury, takes photographs, measurements, and obtains all avail-
able information considered necessary to protect the railroad com-
pany against a possible suit for damages.
S. REP. No. 661, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1939).
161. The FELA does not divest the railroad of any confidentiality that
might apply to its files. See 45 U.S.C. § 60 (1982); iqfra note 164. A district
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their own negligence or testify as to railroad negligence, the
likelihood of a full and effective investigation by the FELA
plaintiff diminishes significantly.
Although the 1906 and 1908 versions of the FELA con-
tained no provisions ensuring plaintiffs free access to co-worker
information, by 1939 Congress had recognized that the threat-
ening practices of railroads could suppress the free flow of in-
formation from co-workers to parties interested in seeking
FELA remedies.162 Although the resulting FELA amendment
did not compel employees to provide information63 or elimi-
nate railroads' privilege with respect to their investigatory
files,164 the amendment is remarkable for its attempt to antici-
pate and prohibit all railroad maneuvers designed to inhibit
free access to information:
Any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose, in.
tent, or effect of which shall be to prevent employees of any common
carrier from furnishing voluntarily information to a person in interest
as to the facts incident to the injury or death of any employee, shall
be void, and whoever, by threat, intimidation, order, rule, contract,
regulation, or device whatsoever, shall attempt to prevent any person
from furnishing voluntarily such information, [shall be punished by
fine or imprisonment] .... 165
This "free access" guarantee thus should bar railroad property
damage claims against co-workers when such claims are
deemed to be "devices" having the effect of preventing employ-
court that is so inclined therefore might attach a work product privilege to the
railroad's on-the-spot investigation. See FED. P. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
162. Bills were introduced in both Houses of Congress to protect the free
flow of information to FELA plaintiffs. S. 1708, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939);
LIR 10,296, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
163. See H.R. REP. No. 2251, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1938).
164. Congress approved a proviso to the amendment added by the House
Judiciary Committee: "Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be con-
strued to void any contract, rule, or regulation with respect to any information
contained in the files of the carrier, or other privileged or confidential re-
ports." FELA, Pub. L. No. 76-382, sec. 3, § 10, 53 Stat. 1404, 1405 (1939) (codi-
fied at 45 U.S.C. § 60 (1982)).
165. Id. (emphasis added). The House author of the amendment described
its purposes:
It makes it possible for the widow of a man who is killed, or the
children of a man who is killed to get some information and facts rel-
ative to his death. This information is made available also to persons
in interest of a man who has been injured; it makes it possible for
them to get some evidence.
As I understand it at the present time no employee is willing, for
fear of losing his job, to give this evidence in the case of a man who is
injured or killed while he is working at his job.
83 CONG. REC. 6917 (1938) (statement of Rep. Healey).
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ees from volunteering information to parties interested in pur-
suing and maintaining FELA suits.
Significantly, Congress adopted this amendment soon after
the House Judiciary Committee report criticized courts for nar-
rowly interpreting the "any ... device whatsoever" clause
within the "no contract-no device" prohibition.166 In response
to such misinterpretations by the courts, Congress banned the
assumption of risk defense in FELA actions.16 7 This rebuke
stands as a warning against limiting unjustifiably the meaning
of "device" within the "free access" guarantee. The 1939
amendment's contemporaneous repetition of the "[a]ny ... de-
vice whatsoever" language evidences Congress's strong desire
to bar all present and future railroad practices obstructing free
access to information supporting FELA actions.
Property damage claims against employees thus are "de-
vices" within the "free access" guarantee, just as counterclaims
are "devices" within the "no contract-no device" prohibition.168
Congress apparently was unaware of the limited history of em-
ployers' claims against employees for negligently caused prop-
erty damage,169 but it adopted the "[a]ny . . . device
whatsoever" language to compensate for such limited knowl-
edge and its limited ability to predict all railroad practices that
could inhibit employees from volunteering information.170 The
flexible "device" concept consequently includes property dam-
age claims against employees if the effect of such claims on the
dissemination of employee information is similar to that caused
by threats of discharge, demotion, or other discipline.171
For any arguably negligent worker, the risk of supplying
information is the risk of complete financial disaster. When a
worker furnishes evidence of personal negligence to anyone in-
terested in pursuing an FELA action, the worker may be fur-
nishing evidence on which the railroad could base a property
damage claim. Even worker-witnesses who believe themselves
free of negligence would risk suffering retaliatory charges of
166. H.R. REP. No. 2153, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1938) ("Since the original
act was adopted, the aggressions of the courts have given to the defense of as-
sumption of risk a scope and quality that threatens enforcement of the act.").
167. See supra text accompanying notes 56-61.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 130-47.
169. See supra notes 75-96 and accompanying text.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 141-42.
171. See H. CONF. REP. No. 1463, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1939) (statement
of the House managers of the bill); 83 CONG. REC. 6916 (1938) (statement of
Rep. Healey).
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negligence and railroad property damage suits. The "common
law" property damage claim, however doubtful its heredity,
would prevent the very flow of co-worker information suppos-
edly protected by the "free access" guarantee.
In Stack v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St Paul and Pacific Rail-
road Co.,172 the railroad counterclaimed in an FELA suit
against the decedent's estate for property damage caused in a
railroad collision and subsequently impleaded surviving crew
members.173 The natural instinct of such defendant-witnesses
is to defend their own interests against the million dollar prop-
erty loss claim.74 The Washington Supreme Court, recognizing
that the railroad chilled the plaintiff's FELA suit by impleading
the crew members, barred the "responsive" actions. 7 5 The
court, however, asserted that the railroad had a common law
right to sue employees for negligently caused property damage;
it merely disapproved the procedure by which the railroad pur-
sued the claims.176 In reaching this conclusion, the court failed
to recognize that the offending "device" under the "free access"
guarantee was not the railroad's impleader of third party de-
fendants into the FELA suit, but the property damage cause of
action itself. The effect on employees' willingness to furnish in-
formation is the same whether the property damage claim is
raised in an FELA suit or brought as an independent action.
The court in Cavanaughl77 tersely rejected the proposition
that a common law claim ever could be barred by the "free ac-
cess" guarantee:
It would seem that the plaintiff is saying that all railroad employees
who have any knowledge of an accident must be given immunity from
liability lest they be prevented "from voluntarily furnishing informa-
tion" in support of plaintiff's action by the threatened possibility that
they too would be sued by the railroad for their responsibility in con-
nection with the accident. We cannot believe that Congress had any
such far-fetched purpose in enacting [the "free access" guarantee].'
78
The court, however, ignored the practical consequences of the
permitted property damage action. A close scrutiny of such
consequences would have forced it to recognize that the claim's
chilling effect was not far-fetched but rather all too likely.
172. 94 Wash. 2d 155, 615 P.2d 457 (1980) (en banc).
173. Id. at 157, 615 P.2d at 458.
174. The railroad in Stack claimed $1.5 million in property damage. Id at
157, 615 P.2d at 458.
175. Id. at 159-60, 615 P.2d at 460.
176. Id. at 158-59, 615 P.2d at 459.
177. 729 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct 222 (1984).
178. Id. at 293.
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By avoiding detailed analysis of the probable effect of the
property damage claim, the Cavanaugh court avoided its duty
under the FELA. The "free access" guarantee expressly pro-
hibits devices having the proscribed chilling effect. Every rail-
road property damage claim against an employee potentially
hinders the availability of evidence in FELA litigation. The
claim's effect is most severe, of course, when asserted against
an employee who may have information about the cause of a
fellow worker's injury or death. Even a claim against an em-
ployee for an accident not involving injury or death, and conse-
quently producing no FELA actions, however, may have a
substantial effect on employee willingness to supply necessary
information in FELA settings. By simply establishing a record
of such claims, railroads may sufficiently intimidate employees
from supplying information in situations in which FELA suits
are possible. The "free access" guarantee logically prohibits
"devices" such as the railroads' property damage claims from
jeopardizing FELA recoveries.
V. AN INVITATION FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION
Throughout the FELA's history, courts have responded
with hostility to the Act's common law alterations, and Con-
gress time and again has reacted to this judicial aggression by
clarifying and expanding the railroad workers' protections
under the FELA.179 In Cavanaugh, a court once again found
that a railroad's common law "rights" could defeat the FELA
protections. Congress once again should "clarify" the FELA
provisions, in this instance by expressly barring railroads from
asserting property damage claims against employees.
Public policy supports such legislative action. Presumably,
railroads, like other businesses, have liability insurance. 8 0 Pre-
cluding railroads' property loss claims consequently should not
result in the financial ruin of the railroads. A railroad's inabil-
ity to recover against a worker, even assuming that the worker
has adequate assets to pay the judgment, would make the rail-
road absorb property losses only to the point that its self-insur-
ance ends and its liability coverage begins. This is not a new
179. See supra text accompanying notes 51-67.
180. See S. HUEBNER, K. BLACK & R. CLINE, PROPERTY AND LIABILITY IN.
SURANCE 4 (1982) ("Less and less of the total risk is borne by capital in indus-
try and more reliance is placed on insurance and prevention."); see also C.
ELLIOT, PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE 124-42 (1960) (discussing general
liability coverage for businesses).
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problem for the railroads; the prospect of their being able to
shift this loss through property damage claims against employ-
ees was not considered a viable option until recently. More-
over, railroads can distribute property losses and insurance
premiums as a cost of doing business. In contrast, permitting
the property damage claim places the burden of accident and
misfortune not on the business in which the worker is engaged,
but squarely on a single individual or family. Such liability dis-
tribution conflicts with the policies underlying the FELAsi
and turns FELA recoveries into evanescent funds, providing
workers with just enough wealth to make property damage
claims worthwhile.
Railroads also might act more affirmatively to improve
railway safety if they could not anticipate reductions of FELA
liability. The railroad industry, although more prominent
among the major industries in 1906, 1908, and 1939, is still a vi-
tal and vast enterprise. 82 Within this "important, extensive,
and hazardous" industry,183 however, railroad collisions and de-
railments continue at an alarming rate. 8 4 Although the tech-
nology exists to improve railroad safety, most tracks, cars,
locomotives, signal equipment, and trafficking systems in the
United States are products of an earlier period of industrial de-
velopment and, in many instances, are now unreliable and out-
moded.85 Automatic train-stopping devices, which could
181. Such liability distribution conflicts with the policies behind the FELA
provisions apportioning liability for joint negligence. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 97-108. The 1908 Senate Judiciary Committee report, submitted in
support of the comparative negligence adjustments, expressed some of these
underlying policies:
[A] principle fairly applicable to a man working with tools which he
could handle and inspect is surely obsolete when applied to the occu-
pation of a brakeman on a modern freight train. Yet somebody must
assume these risks, and the tendency throughout the world in those
countries where the industrial life of the community is thoroughly or-
ganized has been to modify the doctrine of negligence so as to allow
the burden of accident and misfortune to fall, not upon a single help-
less family, but upon the business in which the workman is engaged;
that is, upon the whole community.
S. REP. No. 460, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1908).
182. In 1984, for example, Consolidated Rail Corporation enjoyed profits in
excess of $300 million and received bids from prospective purchasers in excess
of $1 billion. Wall St. J., June 18, 1984, at 4, col. 1.
183. 40 CONG. REc. 4608 (1906) (statement of Rep. Flood).
184. See authorities cited supra note 1.
185. In 1982, the House Subcommittee on Transportation, Aviation and
Materials reported: "There is already a backlog of deferred maintenance and
capital improvements that exceeds $6 billion." HousE SUBCOMMITrE ON
TRANSPORTATION, AvIATION & MATERIALS, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., REPORT ON
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prevent virtually all railroad collisions, have been largely ig-
nored in this country. 8 6 Only a relatively small number of lo-
comotives contain the less expensive and less sophisticated cab
signals that sound an alarm when a train enters an occupied
block.187
As Congress recognized in 1906, the railroad industry's de-
cisions to improve the safety conditions in which its labor force
works are largely governed by economic pressures and incen-
tives. Railroads, having met with some success in placing acci-
dent costs on injured workers or their families, can be expected
to press property damage claims against employees whenever
possible.188 The railroad industry's safety conditions conse-
ADVANCED RAIL TECHNOLOGY 2 (1982). The Science and Technology Commit-
tee's letter of submittal further points out: "Railroads continue to face the
problem of obsolete and deteriorated track, facilities and equipment caused to
some extent by inadequate earnings. While Japan, France, Germany, and
other countries are making significant advances in high speed rail technology,
the U.S. rail system continues to deteriorate at an increasing rate." Id. at v.
186. These devices currently are being developed in England. See Hill,
Fail-safe speed sensor for London Transport automatic trains, 128 I.E.E. PROC.
277 (Nov. 1981); Kerr, An Electronic Signalling System Gets Private Support,
252 THE ENGINEER 13 (June 18, 1981). As explained by the National Transpor-
tation Safety Board, however, recommendations for their use in this country
have been largely ineffective:
On March 14, 1973, as a result of its investigation of an accident at
Herndon, Pennsylvania, the Safety Board recommended that:
"The Federal Railroad Administration, in cooperation with the
Association of American Railroads, develop a fail-safe device to
stop a train in the event that the engineer becomes incapacitated
by sickness or death, or falls asleep. Regulations should be
promulgated to require installation, use, and maintenance of such
a device."
This recommendation has been reiterated four times since 1973, fol-
lowing Safety Board investigations of train accidents at Indio, Califor-
nia, on March 20, 1974; Pettisville, Ohio, on September 10, 1976;
Lewisville, Arkansas, on December 7, 1978; and Muncy, Pennsylvania,
on August 2, 1979.
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT:
REAR END COLLISION OF CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORP. FREIGHT TRAINS ALPG-2
AND APJ-2, NEAR ROYERSFORD, PENNSYLVANIA, Oct. 1, 1979, at 15 (NTSB-
RAR-80-2) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as ROYERSFORD REPORT].
The response of the Federal Railroad Administration to the NTSB recommen-
dations was to select improved training and testing over mechanical "fail safe"
devices. Id.
187. See ROYERSFORD REPORT, supra note 186, at 15. Alerting devices,
which sound an alarm in the locomotive cab when a wayside signal is violated,
have been under consideration by the Transportation Systems Center since at
least 1973. Id. The technology itself is not experimental.
188. Railroads apparently are already organizing for this onslaught by col-
lecting unpublished opinions favorable to the property damage claims. See
Cavanaugh, 729 F.2d at 297 (Hall, J., dissenting).
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quently are more likely to continue to deteriorate. A railroad
that can rely on a common law theory to shift the financial bur-
den of accidents to its workers, even though the railroad itself
has been negligent, is a railroad that will more readily accept
rather than correct grim statistics of employee injury and
death. By expressly prohibiting railroads' property damage
claims against employees, Congress could secure the FELA's
salutary purposes: to compensate injured workers and their
families and to provide a financial incentive for railroads to im-
prove industry safety.
Congress also should take this opportunity to modernize
the FELA's provisions to permit railroad workers and their
families to enjoy the same remedies that are available under
many state statutes and decisions. When adopted, the FELA
was a vanguard of remedial relief. Today, however, its terms
are often surpassed by state law remedies.189 An interstate rail-
road worker should not receive a lower recovery when injured
in a railroad collision than when injured in an automobile colli-
sion. To equalize this disparity of remedies, Congress should
provide that FELA plaintiffs can resort to any judicial remedies
that would be available in the absence of FELA exclusivity.
Railroads would still be protected from the strict liability of
worker compensation schemes,19 0 and the amount of the FELA
recovery would still be reduced in proportion to the employee's
negligence.191 Unlike allowing property damage claims against
employees, federal statutory incorporation of state damage
remedies would further the FELA's aim of ensuring fair com-
pensation and due railroad observance of safety requirements.
CONCLUSION
When Representative Flood stated in 1906 that "the
[FELA's] purpose is to give relief against the rigors of the com-
mon law,"192 he heralded an important shift in national law-
making and social philosophy. Although the FELA did not
wholly abandon common law influences,193 a strong sentiment
that common law alone was not competent to govern the com-
plex area of industrial labor relations runs through the FELA's
189. See supra text accompanying notes 124-28.
190. See supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 102-04.
192. 40 CONG. REC. 4608 (1906) (statement of Rep. Flood).
193. See 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1982) (FELA plaintiff must show that negligence of
railroad or co-worker caused worker's injury or death).
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legislative history.94 The industrial changes in the nation's
most prominent industry had exposed the general inadequacies
and unfairness of that judge-made law, law born not only in a
different country but in a different era. The history of the
FELA is the history of repeated congressional modifications
designed to protect the Act's remedial objectives against the ap-
plication by courts of outdated common law bars to recovery.
If courts continue to thwart Congress's overriding remedial
objective by permitting such liability-avoidance techniques as
the recently invented property damage counterclaim, Congress
once again should intervene to clarify the situation by explicitly
barring such actions. Moreover, just as the FELA should not
be permitted to be disrupted by questionable "common law"
theories of recovery, neither should it be used to preclude re-
covery of damages available under more generous state laws.
By incorporating state damage remedies into the FELA as well
as barring the property damage counterclaim, Congress would
be carrying out the Act's twin objectives of providing effective
relief to railroad workers injured or killed because of their em-
ployer's negligence and giving railroads an economic incentive
to improve the safety of this nation's railroads.
194. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
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